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OMRI Y. MARLAN*

The Discursive Failure in Comparative Tax Law
"What we've got here is ...

failure to communicate."'

Tax comparatiststend to bemoan the grim status of their chosen
field. Complaints are aimed both at the scarcity of decent comparative
legal tax scholarship, and at the lack of a theoretical foundation for
the study of comparative tax law. The purpose of this Article is to portray a more sanguine, yet critical, view of this field. Sanguine, since a
sympathetic reading of contemporary comparative tax scholarship
demonstrates that there is more than enough such scholarship to generate a lively debate on comparative tax works and their
methodologies. Critical, since all of these works fail to produce even
the faintest form of paradigmaticdiscourse. The result is that contemporary academic literature in comparative tax law contains strongly
conflicting arguments, running parallel courses, without ever engaging each other. In this Article, I try to construct a framework for a
coherent and vigorous academic discourse on comparative taxation. I
do so by placing existing comparative tax scholarship in the context of
pivotal debates within general comparative law, and point out the
abundant contradicting arguments in the field of comparative tax
law. One cannot help but wonder how is it that tax comparatistshave
failed to support or rebut each other's positions. One possible reason
for this lack of engagement is perhaps that it enables tax comparatists
to rest comfortably in the warm confines of their own scholarship
without being bothered by questions regardingtheir methodologicaland consequently their ideological-stances.Finally, for the sake of a
debate, I offer my own views by respondingto a recent article authored
by Carlo Garbarino.

* SJD (2009), LL.M. (International Taxation) (2008), University of Michigan
Law School; Associate, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP. I wish to thank Reuven Avi-Yonah,
Doug Kahn, Assaf Likhovski, Mathias Reimann and the participants of a workshop
titled Comparative Taxation: Theory and Practice held at the University of Michigan
for their truly helpful comments on earlier drafts of the article. For brainstorming
with me, I also wish to thank Roni Iluz.
1. STROTHER MARTIN, Cool Hand Luke (Warner Bros. 1967).
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INTRODUCTION

An occasional reader of comparative tax scholarship would
quickly learn that tax comparatists tend to bemoan the grim status of
their chosen field of study. Notable commentators repeatedly express
their frustration with the "sparsity of general literature" in comparative taxation, 2 the "dearth of good comparative tax studies,"3 and the
"marginal role" played by the "comparison of national tax systems" in
academic scholarship. 4 The faultfinding, however, goes beyond complaining about the leanness of scholarly literature. Tax comparatists
point to the seemingly ever-primordial stage of scholarship-a stage
from which the field apparently is not able to extract itself. One
prominent scholar recently noted the lack of any "comprehensive attempt to develop an academic
discipline of 'comparative taxation' or
'comparative tax law'."5
The purpose of this Article is to draw a more sanguine, yet critical, picture of comparative tax studies. Sanguine, since a careful
reading of contemporary comparative tax scholarship demonstrates
that there is more than enough such scholarship to generate a lively
debate about comparative tax works and their methodologies. Critical, since all of these works fail to produce even the slightest form of
paradigmatic discourse. The "non-development" that tax comparatists complain about is largely of their own doing (or rather, nondoing). The real and acute problem with comparative tax studies is
not the lack of good comparative tax works, but the utterly absent
academic discourse about it.
This point can easily be illustrated by looking at the two so-called
"canonic" texts 6 in comparative tax scholarship. These texts have
achieved such a hallowed status that one could not find a comparative tax article failing to cite them. Yet, both of these texts say
almost nothing about the theoretical framework on which they are
based. So how is it that they have achieved such unprecedented esteem? How can two works that have almost no theoretical foundation
become canons? The answer is that tax comparatists simply did not
have anything better at their disposal. While this provides a practical
justification for the extensive reliance on these texts, it also calls for
some serious reflection on the part of tax comparatists.
2. VICTOR THURoNYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAw 6 (Kluwer Law Int'l 2003).
3. Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology: On the Hopes and
Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J. L. & JuRis. 119, 119 (2005) [hereinafter Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology].
4. Carlo Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation: Methods and Agenda for Research, 57 AM. J. CoMP. L. 677, 679 (2009) [hereinafter
Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation].

5. Id.
6. HUGH AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INcOME TAXATION: A STRucTuRAL ANALYSis (2d ed., Kluwer Law Int'l 2004) (1997); THuRoNY, CoMPARATrVE TAX
LAw, supra note 2.
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Yet, the assertion that there were no attempts to develop a theoretical framework for comparative tax law is factually wrong. The
problem is rather that such attempts were usually ignored by everybody except their own authors. In fact, crude attempts to tackle
issues of comparative tax methodology were made and even debated
as early as the late nineteenth century.7 Somewhat more refined endeavors to address the scope, purpose, and methodology of
comparative legal tax studies appeared in the 1950s, 8 while recent
years have seen several sophisticated investigative efforts with regard to these issues. 9 Still, when it comes to issues of metacomparative taxation, tax comparatists rarely cite, and almost never
respond to, each other. Tax comparatists almost always start their
work from scratch, failing to use already existing supportive arguments for their own objective, just as they simply ignore other
authors' contradicting arguments which they should tackle if only to
validate their own conclusions. In that sense, tax comparatists have
fallen victim to their own presupposition that comparative tax is
marginal or non-existent. As a result, the contemporary academic
literature in comparative tax law contains conflicting arguments
that are not being acknowledged, let alone confronted. This non-discourse allowed some tax comparatists to introduce their work as an
objective, apolitical endeavor, when in reality it is anything but
apolitical.
The primary objective of this Article is to shake tax comparatists
out of their discursive coma. I shall try to set up an initial framework
for a coherent academic discourse on comparative taxation: its definers, terminology, scope, purpose, and methodology. Such a frame of
reference is necessary so that tax comparatists can understand each
other, arrive at a fruitful debate and, ultimately, at a qualitative
evaluation of comparative tax works.
7. Edward Atkinson, The Relative Strength and Weakness of Nations, THE CENTURY ILLUSTRATED MONTHLY MAGAZINE, Apr. 1887, at 613. This article ignited a fierce

methodological debate. It must be mentioned however, that most of the debate

evolved around fiscal, rather than legal issues. See, e.g., Henry B. Gardner, Comparative Taxation, SCIENCE, Mar. 25, 1887, at 296; Edward Atkinson, Comparative
Taxation, SCIENCE, Mar. 11, 1887, at 214; Henry B. Gardner, ComparativeTaxation,
SCIENCE, Mar. 4, 1887, at 218.
8. John C. Chommie, A ProposedSeminar in Comparative Taxation, 9 J. LEGAL.
EDUC. 502 (1957); John C. Chommie, Why Neglect Comparative Taxation?, 40 MINN.
L: REV. 219 (1956).

9. See, e.g., Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation,
supra note 4; Livingston, Law, Culture and Anthropology, supra note 3; William B.
Barker, Expanding the Study of ComparativeTax Law to Promote DemocraticPolicy:
The Example of the Move to Capital Gains Taxation in Post-Apartheid South Africa,
109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 703, 703-16 (2005). THuRoNYI, COMPARATTvE TAx LAw, supra

note 2, at 1-14; Anthony C. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination:On Adopting a
ComparativeApproach to Reforming the U.S. International Tax Regime, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNT'L

L. 1105,

1135-57

(2002) [hereinafter Infanti, Spontaneous Tax

Coordination].
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part I addresses the necessary
question: what is comparative taxation? Tax comparatists have usually neglected this preliminary task. Thus, they are lacking a rallying
point from which a discussion can be launched. Part II briefly surveys
common approaches to comparative law research in order to set the
suggested framework for the comparative tax discourse. Part III implements this framework by placing contemporary comparative tax
scholarship in the context of several pivotal debates in comparative
law. Part IV intends to jumpstart a discourse, using the framework
developed in Part III in response to Carlo Garbarino's recent article
in which he promotes an "evolutionary approach" to comparative tax
law. 10 Part V concludes with a call for further discussion.
I.

WHAT IS "COMPARATIVE TAXATION"?

A. In General
With the exception of some rare examples (discussed below), tax
scholars have made no attempt to define "comparative taxation."
Rather, scholars have chosen to explain why it is important and how
should it be done. 1 ' It seems that for the most part, tax comparatists
just did comparative tax research without much thought about what
it is.

It seems that the only attempt at the "what is it?" question was
made by Victor Thuronyi who introduced the question but mentioned
only that "comparative law involves more than just describing the
rules of another legal system." 12 Along the same lines it was recently
argued that "we need to move beyond the idea that comparison is just
a special technique ...

but we should consider it as a separate disci-

pline, strictly hinged to a theoretical framework."1 3 These definitions
are of little help since they do not explain what should or should not
be considered part of this "discipline." Still, they are a starting point.
By agreeing that comparative taxation is more than a "technique,"
these assertions present us with two possible answers to the "what is
it?" question: first, that it is at least a "technique," but probably better called a method of research; second, that it is also more than a
method, presumably some sort of knowledge.
Even the novice general comparatist will immediately recognize
the sustained debate about whether comparative law can be labeled
10. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4.
11. See infra Part III.
12. Victor Thuronyi, What Can We Learn from Comparative Tax Law?, 103 TAX
NoTEs 459, 459 (2004). After this single sentence, Thuronyi immediately turns to describe the "focus" of comparative law, namely, methodological, rather than
definitional, issues.
13. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,
at 684.
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an "academic discipline.' 4 Some commentators assert that comparative law is only a methodology for legal research. 15 Some go as far as
to imply that, from a normative perspective, it should not be more
than that. 16 Other, equally notable, commentators point to decades of
incremental accumulation of knowledge in the field of comparative
law. 17 They argue that comparative law is now much more than a
mere method of inquiry-it is "a field of substantive knowledge."' 8
This academic debate is closely related to our inquiry but completely ignored by comparative tax scholars. Following the threads of
this debate will serve two purposes: first, it will provide tax scholars
with an arena in which they can present the essence of their comparative research; and second, I shall put forth the argument that
comparative taxation is a substantive body of knowledge, and not a
method of research.
B. Is There a Unique Method of Legal Comparative Tax Research?
During the past two decades, methodological issues have been
fiercely debated in the context of comparative legal studies. 19 Unfortunately, this debate has failed to produce a coherent outcome. 20 The
only obvious result of this continuing discussion is our inability to
point to a single, commonly preferred methodological approach to
comparative legal studies. Instead, this debate shows that the word
"method" is perceived as "techniques by which comparisons are carhave thereby acquired the status of
ried out. These techniques
21
separate methods."
14. For a brief discussion on this long-lasting debate see PETER DE CRUZ, COMPAR-

231-32 (3d ed., Routledge Cavendish 2007) (1999).
15. Just to name a few notable commentators: KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz,
AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATivE LAw, 2 (3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1977)
(asserting that "Comparative law is the comparison of the different legal systems of
the world"); W. J. Kamba, Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework, 23 INT'L
COMp. L.Q. 485, 489 (1974) ("Comparative law is the systemic application of comparison to law."); 0. KAHN-FREUND, COMPARATIVE LAw As AN ACADEMIC SUBJECT 4
(Clarendon Press, 1965) (stating that "Comparative law-this has almost become a
commonplace-is not a topic, but a method").
16. James Gordley, Is ComparativeLaw a DistinctDiscipline?,46 Am. J. Comp. L.
607 (1998). For a brief analysis of Gordley's article, see Ugo Mattei & Mathias Reimann, Introduction, 46 AM. J. CoM. L. 597, 599 (1998) (arguing that Gordley's
position "implies a strong normative claim: comparative law should not be a separate
discipline").
17. Mathias Reimann, The Progressand Failureof ComparativeLaw in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. Comp. L. 671, 673-84 (2002).
18. Id. at 684.
ATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD,

19. For a recent outline of this debate, see Oliver Brand, Conceptual Compari-

sons: Towards a Coherent Methodology Of Comparative Legal Studies, 32
J. INT'L L. 405, 409-35 (2007).

BROOKLYN

20. Reimann, supra note 17, at 689.

21. Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology, 53 Am. J. Com. L. 261, 263 (2005).
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This is an important conclusion for two reasons: first, it points to
various existing comparative techniques which we may or may not
adopt for the comparative study of tax laws. Second, assuming that
tax laws do need a special methodology of their own in order to be
studied comparatively, it implies that there may be more than one
adequate method. Looking at the first issue, namely that there are
several existing comparative methods, we can immediately assess
what is certainly not a comparative tax methodology: when tax comparatists execute their research by using an existing comparative
legal methodology, they are not employing any distinctively new
methodology that could be labeled "comparative taxation;" instead,
they are using one of several available comparative law methodologies for the purpose of studying tax laws.
Several tax comparatists have specifically chosen this option. For
example, Garbarino defines his recent endeavor as an attempt to
identify "the methods which can be used to pursue comparative analysis" of tax studies. 2 2 He portrays the process of comparative taxation
as one in which the first step is the "selection of methodological approaches," 2 3 and then he adopts an existing methodological modus
operandiof comparative legal studies-the "functional approach." 24 In
a similar view, when Ann Mumford describes her objective as an attempt to "provide a cultural context for the laws of tax collection,
within a comparative ... structure," 25 she specifically associates herself with the school of comparative law and legal culture in which a
scholar must identify and interpret the "legal cultures" of the jurisdictions studied. 26 Cases such as these are easy: scholars who adopt
existing methodologies are not creating new methodological approaches (nor do they pretend to do so).
It is possible, however, to pursue the comparative study of tax
law without specifically adopting an existing method of comparative
legal studies. This brings me to the second point, namely, that there
is a possible technique which is a uniquely fitted to the comparative
study of taxation (but inappropriate for other purposes) and therefore
can be said to be "a comparative tax method." Here too, the existing
unsettled debate on comparative legal methodology provides an important tool. Even though general comparatists have often refrained
from outlining their methods of research, they have addressed the
issue of "what a method must include." This debate envelopes sev22. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,
at 679.
23. Id., at 685.

24. Id., at 686.
25. ANN MUMFORD,

TAXING CULTURE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF TAX COLLECTION LAW

1 (Ashgate Pub. Ltd. 2002).
26. See Roger Cotterrell, Comparative Law and Legal Culture, in THE OXFORD
709, 721-26 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
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eral key controversies: the purpose of comparison, its underlying
assumption of similarities or differences of the jurisdictions studied,
the choice of objects to be compared, and the specific technique to be
27
applied for the purpose of comparison.
These controversies point to the issues that a comparative methodology should address. 28 If we were to find a body of scholarship in
comparative taxation that had developed a novel process for dealing
with these issues, then we could argue that there is indeed a comparative legal tax methodology. But there is no such body of scholarship.
Of the major works on comparative tax studies all use methodologies that can be associated with an existing school of thought in
general comparative law. Once an existing method is found to be satisfactory, there is hardly a need to take on the tormenting task of
inventing a new one. The conclusion is that "comparative tax law" is
not a method of research in its own right, but rather an application
of "comparative law" methodologies to the study of tax laws. This issue is further discussed in Part III below.
C.

Comparative Taxation as a Substantive Body of Knowledge

At the most basic level, the process of comparison refers to the
"construction of relations of similarity or dissimilarity between different matters of fact." 29 Such comparison is meant "to encompass the
search for new categories for understanding relevant similarities or
dissimilarities, or rethinking existing ones." 30 This, in essence, is
what is meant by "comparative knowledge," namely, something more
than a simple juxtaposition of (tax) laws in different countries. It is
knowledge which emerged from such a comparison and which could
not have been produced in a non-comparative fashion. Interestingly,
tax comparatists have been able to produce an impressive volume of
such new knowledge. Some examples will illustrate the point.
Perhaps the most impressive display of such knowledge in a single work is found in the two-volume IMF publication, Tax Law
Design and Drafting,edited by Victor Thuronyi. 3 1 The stated purpose
of this voluminous work is to "provide nonprescriptive drafting
27. Two good examples which thoroughly outline these pivotal issues in comparative legal studies are: David Kennedy, The Methods and the Politics, in COMPARATIVE
LEGAL STUDiEs: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 345 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Mundy
eds., 2003); Hiram E. Chodosh, ComparingComparisons: In Search of Methodology,
84 IowA L. REV. 1025 (1999).
28. See infra Part III.
29. Nils Jansen, ComparativeLaw and ComparativeKnowledge, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw, supra note 26, at 205, 310.
30. Id., at 311.
31. INT'L MONETARY FuND,TAX LAw DESIGN AND DRAFTING I (Victor Thuronyi ed.,
Int'l Monetary Fund 1996) (1996) [hereinafter Thuronyi, TLDD I]; I'r'L MONETARY
FUND, TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING II (Victor Thuronyi ed., Int'l Monetary Fund
1998) (1996) [hereinafter Thuronyi, TLDD II].
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materials that cover the major choices to be made in constructing a
tax system." 32 It does so by drawing on the collective experience of
numerous contributors who drafted tax laws and advised on tax legis33
lation for over two dozen countries over a five year period.
Thuronyi specifically mentions that the book's new knowledge
"represents an effort to distill from our collective experience, and
from the tax laws of many other countries in the world, practical
guidelines that can be used by officials of developing and transition
countries and by their foreign advisors." 34 Taking into account the
tax codes of numerous jurisdictions, each chapter deals with the various ways of addressing a specific tax issue, as well as problems which
may arise and their possible solutions. The result is "an alternative to
the model code approach to tax reform in developing and transition
countries." 3 5 Of course, such an outcome can be criticized on various
grounds, beginning with doubts about the technical accuracy of its
suggestions and ending with assertions of post-colonial paternalism. 36 But it is hard to deny that it constitutes a new comparative
substantive knowledge which could not have been gained without the
collective experience of its contributors.
Another example of new comparative knowledge in Tax Law Design and Drafting is the taxonomy of legal "tax families." 3 7 Even
though the classification of legal families is a long established concept in general comparative law, and hence not a completely novel
approach (as Thuronyi admits), 38 such a comprehensive classification
was new to tax laws when introduced by Thuronyi. Given the fact
that the focus was income tax rather than private law (the traditional
focus of comparative legal studies), the result was a slightly different
taxonomy than the one established in general comparative law. The
concept of classification is regarded by its proponents as an essential
part of the process of comparison. 3 9 Even if one takes a critical look at
the notion of classification, 40 it does provide a rallying point for an
important methodological debate. Whatever the case may be, it is obvious that such typology could not have been brought about without
32.
33.
34.
35.
19

Thuronyi, TLDD I, supra note 31, at xxvii.
Id.
Id.
Miranda Stewart, The "Aha" Experience: Comparative Income Tax Systems,

TAX NoTEs IN'L 1323, 1330 (1999).

36. Most reviewers were positive, e.g., Stewart, id.; Lief Muten, Book Reviews:
Tax Law Design and Drafting (Vol. 1), 14 TAX LAW INT'L 677 (1997); but cf John Azzi,
Book Review: Tax Law Design and Drafting (Vol. 2): ComparingIncome Tax Laws of
the World, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 196 (2000).
37. Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxiii-xxxv; see also THURoNYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAw, supra note 2, at 23-44.
38. Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxv.
39. John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 622
(1998).
40. See infra Part IIC.
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the comparison of multiple tax jurisdictions and hence, qualifies as
comparative tax knowledge.
A second instance of comparative tax knowledge, and quite a different one, is evident in the works of Michael Livingston. In two
articles, 4 1 Livingston revisits the assumption that globalization poses
a threat to the ideal of progressive taxation, presumably since in a
world of increased capital mobility, the taxpayers paying the highest
tax rates also have the best capability to shift their income to low tax
jurisdictions. Livingston looked into what he defines as the "tax culture" of four jurisdictions (United States, Italy, India, and Israel) and
their handling of the progressivity issue. Livingston defines "tax culture" as "the body of beliefs and practices that are shared by tax
practitioners and policy makers in a given society and thus provide
the background or context in which substantive tax decisions are
42
made."
Obviously, tax culture in the way Livingston perceives it is a
strictly local concept. But Livingston's endeavor actually seeks to
reach some general conclusions ("new knowledge") about the interrelations between global and local factors in the design of tax policies.
Such a task would be impossible if only a single jurisdiction were
studied. In that case, any conclusion would be relevant only to that
specific jurisdiction. By contrast, comparison of different local tax cultures allows Livingston to present an argument that is somewhat
more global in scope. Livingston concludes 43 that local factors play a
key role even amid globalization. This leads him to a rather skeptical
view of tax convergence-an idea otherwise happily adopted by tax
scholars. 44 Once again, this conclusion would not be possible if not for
the process of comparison, and thus it represents a form of substantive comparative tax knowledge.
These two examples are not random. Both Thuronyi and Livingston addressed the methodological issues in very different ways. Both
produced "new" comparative knowledge, but Thuronyi did so by seeking out similarities,while Livingston identified differences. Yet, they
do not debate their methodological differences, obvious as they are.
This shows that substantive comparative tax knowledge can be gen41. Michael A. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, Changing in Tel-Aviv: Reflections of ProgressiveTaxation and "Progressive"Politicsin a Globalized but Still Local
World, 54 AM. J. CoMP. L. 555 (2006) [hereinafter Livingston, From Milan to
Mumbai]; Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology, supra note 3, at 124-29.
42. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, at 560.
43. Id., at 582-86.
44.

See, e.g.,

REUVEN Avi-YONAH,

INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW

(2007); Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4;
Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259
(2003). But cf Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 61
(2002); H. David Rosenbloom, InternationalTax Arbitrage and the "InternationalTax
System," 53 TAX L. REV. 137 (2000).
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erated even without a methodological discourse. The bad news is that
without such a discourse we are left helpless when trying to evaluate
the merits of the new knowledge acquired.
D. The Discursive Failure and its Significance
Throughout the years, tax scholars have made their own more or
less meaningful statements regarding the theoretical aspects of comparative tax law, but most have refrained from addressing theoretical
assertions made by their colleagues. This lack of discourse is demonstrated in Table 1, which maps references to other tax comparatists'
works. X represents a complete disregard of a specific article or book.
v represents a mere reference in the footnotes or bibliography with no
substantive reference to the specific arguments and vv represents an
actual response or substantive reference to another article. 4 5

45. Referrals to a scholar's own articles are ignored. The tax comparatists whose
work I do discuss were chosen based on the fact that they did address theoretical
issues of comparative tax law.
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As is evident from the table, "X" is dominant, which means that
comparative tax discourse is in short supply. Its absence is of
profound significance. As long as tax comparatists refrain from
talking and responding to each other, comparative taxation remains
incapable of engaging in true evolutionary discourse. Hence, a
discursive framework is badly needed in order to transform
comparative taxation into a meaningful progressive field of study.
Borrowing the words of Livingston, which were aimed at another taxrelated discursive failure, but which are just as applicable here: "A
compartmentalized discourse, in which various groups advance
separate complaints ... is unlikely to produce needed changes."5 5
II.

A

SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARATIVE TAX DISCOURSE:
SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN COMPARATIVE LAW

A.

In General

Comparison is not at all unique to legal research. It is shared by
most academic disciplines. In that sense, comparison is a "parent discipline" with many offspring, one of which is comparative law.
According to the same logic, comparative law may be regarded as a
parent discipline for comparative research in specific legal areas, including tax law. Thus, the first obvious source which may provide us
with methodological and theoretical structures for a discourse in our
topic is general comparative legal studies. This methodological aspect
is the focal point of my Article.
Exploring the methods and reasoning used by tax comparatists
in areas other than law (such as economics and political science)
should also provide valuable building blocks for our proposed discursive framework. In addition, examining the discourse of comparative
studies in specific areas of public law other than tax (such as comparative administrative law or comparative constitutional law) should
add another valuable source of insights. Yet, these two aspects of a
theoretical framework are not explored here.
Instead, this part briefly surveys the main schools of thought in
comparative legal studies. Experienced comparatists will find this
terrain familiar and are thus invited to skip directly to the next part
of the Article. Tax comparatists, however, should benefit from the
terms and methodologies introduced here, which I suggest should be
used in academic debates in comparative taxation.
Obviously, I cannot cover the entire breadth of discourse in comparative law. Still, within each approach discussed here, I shall refer
to several key issues, described by Chodosh as the "why, what and
55. Michael A. Livingston, Radical Scholars, ConservativeField: Putting "Critical
Tax Scholarship" in Perspective, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1791, 1793 (1998) [hereinafter:
Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field].
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how of comparison," 56 namely, the purpose, the objects, and the technique of comparison. Only the most obvious representatives and
arguments are mentioned, thus omitting numerous scholars who
have made important "middle-ground" contributions. Mentioning
them all would simply lead us into too much detail.
Four comparative schools are surveyed below: The first is the
FunctionalApproach which rests on the assumption that different
legal systems face similar problems. Functionalists see the convergence of legal systems as a desirable. Their comparative project is
thus aimed at identifying a common legal solution to a common social
problem. The second is the Economic Approach which starts with an
assumption that there is a competitive market for legal models. In
essence, comparative economic research is aimed at inquiries into the
deviations of different jurisdictions from an economically efficient
benchmark. Third, cultural comparatists reject the functional assumptions of similarities of social problems and legal solutions.
Instead, they assume that law is part of a broader cultural phenomenon. Each culture contains elements such as values, traditions, and
beliefs, which make it unique. This "differentiation of cultures" entails that the laws (which are embedded in these cultures) are also
necessarily different. According to this approach, comparative analysis should be aimed at understanding the cultural, social, political,
and ultimately legal identities. Finally, critical studies in comparative law are aimed at exposing the pretentious apolitical nature of socalled mainstream discourse in comparative law and to suggest alternative discursive agendas. Such scholars argue that comparative
legal studies should be a "liberating project," releasing us from the
cognitive cage of abstract relativist dichotomies which are wrongly
perceived as "objective."
B.

The FunctionalApproach to Comparative Law

Scholars in comparative law have suggested numerous objectives
which may be served by comparative studies. 57 Yet, all the more specific goals can usually be reduced to three main categories:
58
"Understanding, reform and unification."
Unificationis an attempt "to reduce or eliminate.., the discrepancies between national legal systems by inducing them to adopt
common principles of law." 59 Ideas of unification (and harmonization)

are strongly associated with the functionalist heritage of comparative
56. Chodosh, supra note 27, at 1032.
57. Mathias Reimann, The End of Comparative Law as an Autonomous Subject,
11 TuL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 49, 54 (1996) (arguing that the number of purposes that have

been suggested is so great that it is very difficult to "clearly to state what comparative
law teaching is designed to achieve ....

").

58. Chodosh, supra note 27, at 1069.
59. ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 15, at 24.
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law, which dominated (and probably still does) comparative legal
thought during most of the twentieth century. 60 Comparative legal
functionalism rests on the assumption that "the legal system of every
society faces essentially the same problems, and solves these
problems by quite different means, though very often with similar
results."6 1 In other words, if legal problems and legal outcomes are
the same, unifying the laws (as the means to solve similar problems
with similar results) would save a lot of headache.
Functional thinking advances a "functionally equivalent" approach to jurisdictional selection. This means that we must select
"comparable" jurisdictions, i.e., jurisdictions which are at a similar
level of evolutionary legal development. 6 2 For this reason, classification is "the beginning rather than the end, a preliminary step
designed to facilitate the study of otherwise unwieldy body of information. It is a prerequisite to thinking and speaking about the
63
underlying differences and similarities among various objects."
Zweigert and Kotz argue that classification provides us with jurisdictions that are representative of large groups and thus with a natural
choice for comparison. 6 4 These would be, as their rule of thumb goes,
English, French, and German law, as each is considered to be a "par65
ent system" of their respective legal families.
Steeped in a nationalist tradition, the taxonomy of legal families
naturally saw the national unit as an object of both classification and
comparison. 6 6 This leads to an obvious tendency to compare "systems" or "families," or at least to compare the "system's laws" as a
part of a larger, well-defined, "whole." This sort of comparison can be
regarded as "macro-comparison." It should be distinguished from
"micro-comparison" in which the object is limited in scope to a specific law, process, or institution. 6 7 Even though the issue used to be a
contentious one, today it would probably be difficult to find a scholar
60. Well, even this apparently factual issue is debatable. For example, Brand asserts that: "Today . . .the so-called 'functional method,' has risen to a position of
dominance." Brand, supra note 19, at 409. On the other hand it was argued that "the
functional method ...never represented ...the dominant approach to comparative
legal studies ...Nor is it the prevailing method today .... ." Michele Graziadei, The
Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 27, 100, 100.
61. ZWEIGERT AND KOTZ, supra note 15, at 34.
62. Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Science of ComparativeLaw, 7 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 94,
96 (1939).
63. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET. AL., COMPARATIVE LAw: CASES, TEXTS, MATERIALS
1, 41 (6th ed. 1998) (1979), cited in Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons:In Search of
Methodology, supra note 27, at 1091.

64. RUDOLF B.

SCHLESINGER ET. AL., COMPARATIVE LAw: CASES, TEXTS, MATERIALS

1, 41 (6th ed. 1998) (1979).
65. Id. at 41.
66. See generally H. Patrick Glenn, The NationalistHeritage,in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 27, at 76, 76.
67. See Kamba, supra note 15, at 505-06.
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who advocates micro or macro comparison as an exclusively favored
approach. Most scholars agree that the option to use either lends itself to the purpose of comparison, i.e., that macro comparison is
probably a legitimate approach for certain purposes, while micro
comparison is for others.
When it comes to the question of which laws to compare, the
functionalist approach asserts that only those that fulfill the same
functions in their respective jurisdictions are comparable. 68 Zweigert
and Kotz suggest their presumption of similarity as a heuristic device: setting aside topics which are "heavily impressed by moral views
or values" 6 9 (such as family laws) and concentrating on "apolitical"
areas of law (such as private law), they "find that as a general rule
developed nations answer the needs of legal business in the same or
in a very similar way."70 In other words, when we compare the socalled "apolitical" laws of two "developed" nations, it should not be
difficult to locate rules that perform the same function.
Finally, once a purpose of comparison is embraced and the objects of comparison are selected, we must face the question of the
comparative technique. The functional assumption of similarities
suggests that a comparative legal researcher should start by identifying a specific practical problem and then investigate the way in which
it is solved in each of the jurisdictions compared (the "problem-solving approach"). Another possible way to address such assumptions is
to take an institutional view: namely, to inquire which institutions in
the countries compared perform the same problem-solving functions
71
("the institutional approach").
Kamba suggested that an effective comparison should encompass
three stages. 72 The first is the descriptive phase, in which the comparatist is expected to describe the "norms, concepts and institutions
of the systems concerned." 73 The second is the identificationphase, in
which the researchers identify the differences and similarities between the systems studied. The last is the explanatory phase, in
which the reasons for convergences and divergences are explained.
Similarly, Zweigert and Kotz 74 depict the comparative research as a

five-stage process. 75 First, one must identify a problem in functional
68. ZWEIGERT & KOTz, supra note 15, at 34.
69. Id. at 40.
70. Id.

71. Esin Orucu, Methodology of ComparativeLaw, infra note 72, at 443.

72. Kamba, supra note 15, at 511-12. Orucu advocates a similar approach: Esin
COMPARATIVE LAw: A HANDBOOK 43, 47-53
(Esin Orucu & David Nelken eds., 2007); Esin Orucu, Methodology of Comparative
Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw 442, 447-49 (Jan M. Smits ed.,
2006).
73. Kamba, supra note 15, at 511-12.
74. ZWEIGERT & KoTz, supra note 15.
75. Id., at 32-47, conveniently summarized by Infanti in Spontaneous Tax Coordination, supra note 9, at 1138-40.
Orucu, Developing Comparative Law, in
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terms. Rather than depicting a problem in its local context, it is perceived as an apolitical set of social facts conceptualized in universal
terminology. Second, the researcher has to choose the jurisdictions to
be compared. We already noted Zweigert and Kotz's rule of thumb in
this regard. From here on, Zweigert and Kotz turn to an approach
similar to Kamba's. The third stage in their process is descriptive.
The fourth stage is identification of similarities and differences. The
assumption of similarities leads Zweigert and Kotz to assert that, put
in functional terms, we should expect more similarities than differences. Fifth, there is a critical evaluation stage in which the
researcher must evaluate the solution adopted by different jurisdictions and determine which solution is superior to others. While it
remains unclear which standards one must apply for such evaluation, it is obvious that Zweigert and Kotz believe in the existence of a
so-called "proper solution."
Another example of the problem-solving approach is The Common Core method, which is largely associated with Rudolph
Schlesinger and the Cornell Project. In the late 1950s, Schlesinger
launched a research project with the intent to "find the common core
of the law of obligations."7 6 He formed a team of local specialists in
the countries studied and presented them with a "working paper."
The paper contained questions regarding the legal status of the research topic in each jurisdiction. In order to overcome social and
cultural barriers, Schlesinger refrained from using abstract legal
terms such as "contract." instead, the paper contained descriptions of
factual situations. In what can be described as the "descriptive
phase" of Schlesinger's research, each participant was asked to describe how the legal system in his or her home country would react to
the scenario described. In the "identification phase" the specialists
were presented with all the jurisdictional reports produced and asked
to study them. They then met and discussed the reports in an effort
to formulate, in "general reports," major areas of agreement and disagreement among the jurisdictions. Schlesinger's work did not try to
provide explanations of these differences or similarities, but was interested in reaching a consensus as to what the systems have in
common (the so-called common core).
One problem with Schlesinger's approach is that jurists' reports
alone cannot possibly provide a full account of the law in a given
76. RuDoLF B. SCHLESINGER, FORMATIONS OF CONTRACTS: A STUDY OF THE COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 5-65 (1968); Rudolf B. Schlesinger, The Common Core of
Legal Systems: An Emerging Subject of ComparativeStudy, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAw: LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HESSEL E. YNTEMA 65, 66
(Kurt H. Nadelmann, Arthur T. Von Mehren & John N. Hazard eds., 1961). For the
methodological description of Schlesinger work, see Schlesinger, The Common Core of

Legal Systems, supra, at 72-77.
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country. Law is probably more than what jurists say it is. 7 7 Another
problem is that it is a static observation of laws. Schlesinger's method
studies law at a given point in time not allowing for the description of
long-term legal processes from a comparative perspective. 78 Such
criticism became the basis for the legal formants approach developed
79
by Rodolfo Sacco.
A formant of law "may be a group, a type of personnel, or a community, institutionally involved in the creation of law."8 0 These

formants produce different kinds of texts through which we can understand law. So when it comes to technique, we are asked to start by
looking at the institutions (formants) and their outputs (texts),
rather than at putative problems and their solutions as reported to us
by local specialists. The formants approach is aimed at identifying
the differences among the documents studied, directly challenging
the assumption that the legal rules is a given system are monolithic.
After the differences in the texts are revealed, we can then reconstruct law as "a set of interlocked documents used by professionals
according to their personal or institutional strategies."8 1 Such an approach "makes it possible to keep the ambivalence and multiplicity of
82
legal rules in each system at play in the comparison."
According to its proponents, the legal formants approach is espe8 3 since its
cially useful for the study of legal transplants,
identification phase is aimed at exposing differences in the sources of
law. It "offers a picture of laws as bundles of transplants of competing
sources of law."8 4 In other words, the formants approach sees com-

parison as a historical science, and thus naturally serves the
transplants theory which explains the formation of legal systems in
85
terms of the historical process of legal borrowings.
The traditional common core approach and the formants approach heavily affect contemporary practices of comparative legal
studies. The obvious manifestation is the previously noted Common
Core of EuropeanPrivate Law Project (also known as the Trento Project). This project also starts with a factual questionnaire much like
77. Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 339 (1997).
78. Brand, supra note 19, at 419-20.
79. Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:A Dynamic Approach to ComparativeLaw, 39
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 343 (1991).

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 400.

83. P.G. Monateri & Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants, in THE NEW PALGRAVE Dic531 (P. Newman ed., 2004) (1998).
84. Id.

TIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW

85.

ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW

(1974).
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Schlesinger's work-paper. 86 However, unlike the Cornell Project, the
current questionnaire contains questions which relate to the formants theory. For example, respondents are asked not only to
provide a description of the operative rules in the countries studied,
but also to address the role of meta-legal formants in these jurisdictions.8 7 This project has been described as "functionalism in a
revamped version "that brings in sharper awareness of the multiplicity of factors which must be taken into account." 8
C.

The Economic Approach to Comparative Law

Some commentators categorize the economic approach to comparative law-mistakenly, I believe-as an alternative to
functionalism. In reality, however, it is a functional approach taking
a self-conscious ideological turn. Established by Ugo Mattei8 9 and
others, it simply provides a criterion according to which we should
judge what the proper solution is: efficiency. Instead of asking which
laws or institutions fulfill which functions, it asks which do so in the
most efficient manner. It starts with an assumption that "there is a
competitive market for the supply of law."90 Legal transplants, from
an economic point of view, are actually a competitive circulation of
legal models, a process in which only efficient models survive, hence
leading to convergence. 9 1 In essence, comparative economic research
is aimed at inquiries into the deviations of different jurisdictions from
an economically efficient benchmark: a so-called "model legal
92
institution."
D. The Cultural Approach to Comparative Law
To be practical, the assumption that different jurisdictions face
similar problems forces functional comparatists to define their compared problems in similar terms. However, it is just as possible to
assume that different cultural contexts ascribe different moral values
to similar factual patterns. What is seen as a problem in one place is
not necessarily a problem elsewhere. Also, the functional assumption
of similar legal outcomes naturally invites the researcher to concentrate on similarities, ignoring cultural and social differences, thus
86. On the technique of comparison, see Bussani & Mattei, supra note 77, at 35154.
87. Id., at 355.
88. Graziadei, supra note 60, at 117.
89. UoO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAw AND

ECONOMICS

(1997).

90. Raffaele Caterina, ComparativeLaw and Economics, in
OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 72, at 161, 161.

ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA

91. Id., at 161-62.
92. Ugo Mattei & Fabrizio Caffagi, ComparativeLaw and Economics, in THE NEw
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW, supra note 83, at 346, 347.
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reducing significant differences to terminological
abstracts which
93
may well seem similar, but in reality are not.
Thus, cultural comparatists see law as a part of a broader cultural phenomenon. 9 4 Each culture contains "non-rule" elements such
as values, traditions, and beliefs, which give each culture its uniqueness. This differentiation of cultures entails that the laws (which are
embedded in these cultures, or express them) are necessarily different. 95

Thus,

rather

than

looking

for

similarities,

cultural

comparatists concentrate their research on a quest for differences.
Accordingly, cultural comparatists note that an agenda of unification calls, by definition, for the annulment of cultural identity as
expressed in the unique laws of a given society. Writings in comparative legal culture have long celebrated (or urged that we should
celebrate) the virtue of "difference," 96 since difference "satisfies the
need for self-transcendence." 9 7 Merryman noted that "when the
forces of unification threaten what gives a people its cultural identity,
it is time we draw back and reconsider."9 On the practical level,
some cultural comparatists argue that even if for some reason desirable, unification is an unattainable goal, noting that "'Uniformity,' in
the sense of a 'commonality' across laws, is a promise that law is simply ontologically incapable of fulfilling."9 9 For example, they take a
rather skeptical stance towards legal transplants. In Legrand's view,
legal cultures are unique so that, "what can be displaced from one
jurisdiction to another is, literally, a meaningless form of words ...
because, as it crosses boundaries, the original rule necessarily undergoes a change that affects it qua rule."100
According to this approach, a law which is, as suggested by
Zweigert and Kotz, not "impressed by moral views," simply does not
exist. Assuming that laws can be free from moral content, is not only
assuming the impossible, it also essentially strips law from all that is
interesting for the sake of reducing it to a quasi-biological, neutral
phenomenon. 10 Even if we accepted such a view, the obvious outcome of choosing a non-political realm of law as an object of
93. Brand, supra note 19, at 419-20.
94. Cotterrell, supra note 26, at 710.
95. Id., at 711-12.
96. See, e.g., Roger CotterreU, Is It so Bad to be Different? ComparativeLaw and
the Appreciation of Diversity, in COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK, supra note 72, at

133; Roger Cotterrell, ComparativeLaw and Legal Culture, supra note 26, at 726-33.
97. Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES:
TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS, supra note 27, at 240, 280.

98. Pierre Legrand, John Henry Merryman and ComparativeLegal Studies: A Dialogue, 47 AM. J. CoMP. L. 3, 46 (1999).

99. Pierre Legrand, The Return of the Repressed: Moving Comparative Legal
Studies Beyond Pleasure,75 TuL. L. REV. 1033, 1047 (2001).

100. Id., at 120.
101. Pierre Legrand, Paradoxically,Derrida:For a Comparative Legal Studies, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 631, 649-50 (2005).
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comparison is the total removal of public law from the comparative
discourse. 102 This would have profound implications for taxation as a
branch of public law. Thus, taken at face value, the functionalist ap10 3
proach simply cannot serve us to study comparative taxation.
Moreover, it was argued that law is by definition a phenomenon
strictly embedded in political considerations, and furthermore, even
the very choice of laws to be compared cannot be regarded as objective and free from political implications. 104 Rather, the choice of laws
to compare is seen as a normative (even ideological) argument about
things that matter.
Nevertheless, comparative culturalists do not intend to abandon
comparative law all together, but rather to change its objectives. Instead of pursuing the unification of laws, they promote the
understandingof the legal identities in order to maintain and appreciate differences among legal cultures.' 0 5 Understanding is an
attempt "to understand the nature of law and legal change in10 both
6 It
foreign (and by reverse projection) domestic environments."
must be emphasized that understanding is not only an explanatory
factor in the interpretation of legal systems, but a self-standing
objective.
Like their fellow functionalists, cultural comparatists do not consider either micro or macro comparisons preferable per se, yet,
Chodosh does criticize the fact that comparatists tend to divorce one
level of analysis from the other. He argues that "comparisons must be
versatile enough to shift between the micro and macro level. If not,
comparisons risk falling into over generalization on the one hand...
and extra-contextual specificity on the other." 10 7 Cultural comparatists do attack, however, the heuristic utility of classification
used by functionalists, since-so the argument goes-a comparative
study with such classification misses the entire point of comparison.
Ex ante classification simply presupposes what we seek to achieve.
Even worse, such taxonomies tend to generalize, utilizing only a few
factors of differences or similarities as their criteria of classification. 0 8 At best, classification should be the result of a comparative
study.109

From a methodological point of view, a cultural comparatist
would first have to identify the legal cultures of the jurisdictions
studied. But what are the components of a legal culture? The answers
102. Id., at 652.
103. See infra Part III.C.
104. Jansen, Comparative Law and Comparative Knowledge, supra note 29, at
314-15.
105. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, How to Compare Now?, 16 LEGAL STUD. 232 (1996).
106. Chodosh, supra note 27, at 1070.
107. Id., at 1111.
108. Id., at 1100.
109. Id., at 1091-1102.
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to this question are at least as numerous as the number of cultural
comparatists discussing them. 110 Indeed, "it seems impossible to
specify the content, scope or power of legal culture with clarity."11 '
Yet, Nelken categorizes cultural comparatists into two major
groups, 1 2 exemplified in the Cotterrell-Friedman debate. Roger Cotterrell suggested that cultural comparatists should adopt "ideal
types" of legal institutions, which he defines as "logically constructed
concepts deliberately designed not to represent empirical reality but
to organize interpretation of it,"1 3 and to use them as benchmarks

for the identification of legal-cultural differences. The price to be paid
by such a methodology is the recognition that legal culture is not an
empirically measurable phenomenon. 1 14 By contrast, Lawrence
Friedman argued that the term "legal culture" is a methodologically
useful way of "lining up a range of phenomena into one very general
category." 1 5 From this general category we can then derive smaller,
less general, and more empirically measurable components.
E.

The CriticalApproach to ComparativeLaw

At the most general level, critical studies in comparative law are
aimed at exposing the pretended apolitical nature of so-called mainstream comparative law and to suggest alternative discursive
agendas. Critics often see mainstream comparative law as a
hegemonial-ideological project aimed at either assimilation or inclusion, culminating in projects of harmonization. 11 6 Instead,
comparative legal studies should be a liberating project, as suggested
by Ginther Frankenberg, releasing us from the cognitive cage of abstract relativist dichotomies (such as common law/civil law; Western/
17
Oriental; self/other), which are wrongly regarded as objective.'
Consequently, classification is perceived negatively. From a critical perspective, classification carries with it what is known as
"Eurocentrism."118 The concentration on European and other Western legal systems in the process of taxonomy has resulted in the
marginalization of non-Western systems. This, in turn, created an inherent bias in favor of Western systems not only in the selection
110. Id., at 715-17.
111. Id., at 724-25.
112. David Nelken, Legal Culture, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
supra note 72, at 372, 376-78.
113. Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Culture, in COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 13, 24-45 (David Nelken ed., 1997).
114. Id., at 25.
115. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Concept of Legal Culture:A Reply, in COMPARING
LEGAL CuLTuREs, id.,

at 33.

116. Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke, Comparative Law Beyond Post Modernism,
49 INT'L & Comp.L.Q. 800, 822-24 (2000).
117. Gtinther Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Re-thinking Comparative Law,
26 HARv. INT'L L. J. 411, 444-45 (1985).
118. Id., at 434-36.
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process of jurisdictions to be studied, but also in the normative evaluation of what are "good/successful" systems. Critical legal
comparatists also object to the very idea of classification as a scientific tool. The argument here is that classification "is inherently static
by fixing, at least temporarily, the objects of classification for purposes of their classification." 1 9 The concern is that pre-existing
taxonomy may "impede, or even prevent, any appreciation of change
or variation on the course of human and legal life and would there120
fore constitute a major obstacle in human understanding."
In methodological terms, Frankenberg suggests a three-step approach to a critical comparative study.' 2 ' Such legal study should
start where other studies end: the conceptualization of complicated
social phenomena into abstract terms, which can be fitted easily with
a legal framework. Then, the comparative scholar is asked to deconstruct the process of legal decision making, exposing the political
interests underlying the process. Once we are in clear view of the
abstract "objective" legal framework on the one hand, and the underlying political interests on the other, the third step is to re-introduce
the legal process, showing how its discourse "ignores, marginalizes or
2
transforms."

III.

12

TOWARDS A COHERENT DISCOURSE: COMPARATIVE TAx
SCHOLARSHIP AS A SUB-FIELD IN COMPARATIVE

LEGAL STUDIES

Admittedly, the idea of using the methods of comparative legal
studies for tax purposes is not new. More than three decades ago,
Hugh Ault and Mary Ann Glendon suggested adopting the theories of
general comparative legal studies for the purpose of comparative tax
law.123 Yet, they stopped short of executing the idea. Notwithstanding Ault's important contributions to comparative tax studies, he,
like other tax comparatists, never clearly harnessed a specific methodological approach to advance a specific point of view. In this
section, I utilize the discursive framework presented by general legal
comparatists in order to demonstrate where tax comparatists divide-but more importantly-and fail to engage.

119. Glenn, supra note 66, at 427.
120. Id., at 426.
121. Id., at 450-52.
122. Id., at 452.
123. Hugh J. Ault & Mary Ann Glendon, The Importance of ComparativeLaw in
Legal Education: United States Goals and Methods of Legal Comparison, 27 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 599, 607 (1975). See also Jorg Manfred Mossner, Why and How to Compare Tax
Law, in LIBER AMICORUM Luc HINNEKENs 303 (2002).
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The "Why". What is the Purpose of Comparative Tax Studies?

Most tax comparatists have, at least briefly, addressed the objectives of their field. Many legal comparative tax scholars see their
work as an essential tool for tax reform. The differences among them
concern the results that such reform is designed to achieve, and the
sensitivity to contextual differences that such reform should take into
account. Some of the scholars take a clear-cut position within the
general discourse of comparative law. Others are not as committed,
but they can still be quite easily associated with one of the approaches described above. For example, they do not prescribe
harmonization as an ultimate purpose, rather, harmonization seems
like a probable outcome of their approach. Others stress contextual
differences, taking a more relativistic approach. The bottom line is
that currently, all kinds of approaches, regardless of the purposes
they serve-so it seems-are "kosher." Apparently, tax comparatists
are quite comfortable with this situation since they do not bother to
confront each other and their contradicting objectives.
The easiest way to see this is by starting at one end of the spectrum. Probably the most obviously functional tax comparatist is
Carlo Garbarino, who in a recent article explicitly adopts the functional approach and advances a functional assumption of common tax
problems. 124 Nowhere in his article does he directly propose a practical end to be served by his functional analysis, but he does offer five
challenges for prospective comparative tax research. Of these five
us with more than a hint of Garbarino's
challenges, the fifth provides
1 25
comparative purposes.
His fifth proposed challenge is to verify whether there is a potential "bottom-up" predominance of a tax consolidation model to be
implemented at the EU-level through closer cooperation. Garbarino
refers here to the European Common Consolidated Corporate Tax
Base Project (CCCTB). In 2001, the European Commission "identified corporate taxation across the European Union as one major
obstacle to the achievement of a common market."1 26 To address this
problem, the European Commission launched a project to eliminate
double taxation of European corporate groups doing business in multiple European jurisdictions. One of the possible approaches for such
a project is to apply an all-European, i.e., comprehensive, solution.
Indeed, by late 2004 a CCCTB working group began discussions with
a view towards replacing "national tax systems by a common tax
124.

Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,

at 681.
125. Id., at 706-09.

126.

MICHAEL LANG

ET AL.,

COMMON CONSOLIDATED

CORPORATE

(Michael Lang et al. eds., 2008).
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base."127 Garbarino specifically uses the CCCTB as an example of
comparative "common core" research and asserts that it may "reveal
the existence of an EU common model of tax consolidation on which
agreement can be reached through reinforced cooperation at the EU
level." 128 In other words, such research should bring about tax unification. In a later article, Garbarino specifically addresses the issue of
tax transplants in a corporate tax environment, and is a little clearer
with respect to his purpose.1 29 He argues that a comparative study of
corporate taxation may present us with "alternative policy choices in
respect to the proper arrangement of fiscal institutions." 30 This is an
ideological assertion, as it assumes that there is a "proper" solution
(and if all jurisdictions were to adopt it, it should lead-again-to
harmonization). In sum, it is not unreasonable to assume that Garbarino views comparative studies of tax law as a tool for reform leading
to harmonization or even unification of tax laws.
Garbarino's position stands in sharp contrast with that of
Anthony Infanti, but never engages it. To begin with, Infanti utterly
rejects the functional approach as inadequate for comparative tax research. He argues that the failure of the functional method to place
law in its local contexts is especially acute in the case of taxation.131
Infanti also rejects the assumption of similarity and the existence of a
common core of tax rules, stating that "[t]he inherently strong undulating nature of tax policy militates strongly against the conclusion
that there are absolute tax rules that may be ascertained simply by
comparing the systems of different countries." 132 However, he does
not resort to abstract notions of "understanding" as the purpose of
comparative tax studies, but specifically advocates such studies as a
practical tool for legislative reform, albeit in a way very different
from Garbarino.
Infanti asserts that his method of comparative tax law "will not
be employed as a vehicle for achieving tax harmonization." 133 Rather,
it is aimed at what he calls "coordination." Unlike tax harmonization
which according to Infanti "would result in each country having exactly the same tax system," 34 tax coordination includes "any
127. Michel Aujean, The CCCTB Project and the Future of European Taxation, in
COMMON CONSOLIDATED CORPORATE TAX BASE,

id., at 11, 32.

128. Carlo Garbarino, Tax Transplants and Circulation of Corporate Tax Models
(Mar. 9, 2009) (working paper, on file with Bocconi Legal Studies Research Group or
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356122).
129. Id.
130. Id., at 21. Emphasis added.
131. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination,supra note 9, at 1140-42.
132. Id., at 1141.
133. Id., at 1141.
134. Id., at 1125. Infanti's discussion of tax harmonization exemplifies the incoherencies that characterizes comparative tax scholarship. What is described as
"harmonization" by Infanti would probably be defined as outright "unification" of laws
in terms of the general comparative discourse. Ironically, what he aims for-i.e., "co-
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adaptation of one country's tax system to that of another." 13 5 Such
adaptation can be multilateral (by way of international agreements)
or "spontaneous." 13 6 Infanti's "spontaneous coordination" is a unilateral act of a country seeking to reform its tax system in order better
to accommodate legislative tax trends abroad. If we accept Infanti's
notion of spontaneous tax coordination, then obviously, in order to
execute such reform successfully, one must take a comparative approach. If we want to be in line with foreign legal trends, we should
13 7
understand them first.
Infanti explains his choice of comparative tax studies as a tool of
tax reform in an interesting way. He notes that "[tihe ensuing debate
over how to reform the ailing U.S. international tax regime has
largely been shaped by the traditional concerns of efficiency, fairness,
and simplicity."' 38 He further notes that "[tihe traditional focus on
these concerns may stem from the fact that they lend themselves to
the theoretical analysis preferred by commentators,"1 39 and he suggests that the reform debate should shift its perspective. He believes
that placing the reform debate in a comparative perspective is needed
in order to liberate the current discussion from its own parochial
view.' 40 In other words, he takes a truly critical stand here exposing
the actual nature of the current "mainstream" debate and suggests
an alternative agenda.
As an example of his argument, Infanti discusses the tax treatment of contributions made by domestic taxpayers to foreign nonprofit organizations.' 4 1 Analyzing the tax regimes in eight countries,
Infanti shows that there is a wide variety of how such contributions
are treated, starting with their effective prohibition and ending with
generous tax incentives to induce them. Such a spectrum allows a
prospective reformist country to borrow an existing model from a
wide array of models, taking into account the unique characteristics
of the reformed system and the context in which it is positioned. That
way, reform is induced through borrowing, without eliminating or ignoring contextual differences. In other words, Infanti maintains that
reform through legal transplants could be desirable, if it takes into
account local differences. Unlike Garbarino, for Infanti there is more
ordination"-would probably be referred to as "harmonization" in terms of the general
discourse. Infanti is not the only one who is affected by this incoherence. Many other
tax comparatists and international tax scholars use comparative jargon and apply
terms such as "harmonization" and "convergence" imprecisely and often incoherently.
135. Id., at 1128
136. Id., at 1132.

137. Id., at 1142 (stating that "comparative analysis will first aid policy makers in
identifying the rules currently in place in other countries-along with any trends in
the rules that
138. Id., at
139. Id., at
140. Id., at
141. Id., at

are being adopted or abandoned by them").
1113.
1119.
1119-20.
1157-1233.
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than one "proper" solution. There are many legislative models, and
each is "proper" in a different context.
In a later article, Infanti specifically addresses the issue of legal
transplants in the tax context, calling it "tax cloning." 142 In Tax Cloning, he probes the general comparative discourse on legal
transplants, illustrating it by the positions taken by Alan Watson
and Otto Kahn-Freund. 143 As Infanti observes, both Watson and
Kahn-Freund advocate transplants as a means of reform, but with
great differences in their attitudes. Kahn-Freund's base assumption
was that of difference, and hence he emphasizes the risk of legal
transplants being rejected due to their incompatibility with the social
and cultural contexts of the target jurisdiction. Watson, on the other
hand, sees law as a largely autonomous phenomenon with its own
tradition and historical evolution. He regards legal history as the
most important factor in legal evolution, while Kahn-Freund puts the
emphasis on socio-legal contexts. Infanti notes, however, that both
Watson and Kahn-Freund would probably agree that transplantation
can only be successful if the recipient system's legal environment is
thoroughly studied in order to determine the form and the extent of
the adjustments the transplanted rule must undergo to be accepted.
In this context, Infanti seems to place himself more closely to
Kahn-Freund, as he believes that, due to their local contextual nature, the risk of rejection is magnified when tax rules are being
cloned. 1 4 4 Based on these observations, Infanti proposes some "ethical guidelines" to American tax experts who are advising transition
countries on issues of tax reform.' 45 According to Infanti, such advisors should not abandon the idea of tax transplants, but should use
caution not to cause harm to the recipient system (which he calls "the
principal of nonmalfeasance"). One of the requirements is to tailor
the cloned rule to the specific context of the recipient country, in a
sense, to avoid quasi-colonial forcing of tax rules upon the target
systems.
Another divergence-oriented view is apparent in the work of
Michael Livingston. I have already discussed some of Livingston's
scholarship 4 6 and noted that Livingston starts with a presumption
of contextual difference. Like some of the general legal cultural comparatists, Livingston sees the study of comparative tax law as a
hermeneutic process. He argues that
[m]uch as comparative taxation inevitably requires a scholar
to consider the impact of cultural issues, the question of tax
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX. REV. 251 (2003).
Id., at 319-36.
Id., at 335.
Id., at 336-37.
See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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culture... leads inexorably to a comparative perspective...
Comparative studies are thus an invaluable tool for discoveror
ing which features of one's own tax system are universal147
"inevitable" in nature, and which are culture dependent.
Thus, Livingston views comparative taxation as a necessary endeavor to understanding any tax system (including one's own.) For
example, in From Milan to Mumbai, 148 Livingston concludes that,
while different countries face similar issues, the outcomes presented
by their tax systems are significantly different due to local considerations. Livingston seeks to understand how local factors may explain
divergences in the concept of progressivity, and how such understanding can help us to comprehend our own system. 149 Hence,
"understanding" actually achieves a practical aim as it casts doubt on
home policies which in turn may bring about discussion, reform, and
improvement.
In this regard, Garbarino and Livingston are at two opposite
ends of the spectrum. Garbarino sees harmonization and convergence
of tax laws as an already occurring (and presumably desirable) phenomenon. On the other hand, Livingston questions the practicality of
tax harmonization as well as its desirability. 15 0 He notes that differences in tax systems are "not random, but relate to underlying
differences in both the national and tax specific cultures .... ,151
Having sketched the two ends of the spectrum, there is still some
middle ground left to cover. As early as 1957, John C. Chommie was
probably the first legal scholar to address theoretical aspects of com15 2
parative tax law scholarship in a somewhat elaborative manner.
Chommie was best known for his scholarship in federal income taxation1 53 and for his authorship of a well-accepted treatise on this
147. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology, supra note 3, at 123.
148. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, supra note 41, at 555.

149. Id., at 584.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 585.
152. Non-legal scholars have indeed made important contributions to the social sciences field of comparative taxation long before Chommie. As noted in Part II.A, such
literature is not covered here and is left for further research. See, e.g., EDWIN R.A.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION

SELIGMAN,

AT HOME AND ABROAD (The Macmillan Co. 1911);

EDWIN R.A.

ESSAYS ON TAXATION (1905). For some later important contributions not

covered here, see CEDRIC SANDFORD, WHY TAX SYSTEMS DIFFER: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAXATION (Fiscal Publ'ns 2000); B. GuY PETERS, THE
POLITICS OF TAXATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1991); AARON B. WILDAVSKY &
CAROLYN WEBBER, HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD

(Simon & Schuster 1986); THE TAX SYSTEM IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (Ken Messere ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
153. See Charles 0. Galvin, Reflection of Tax Reform: A Tribute to John Chommie,
29 U. MIAMI L. REV 21, 21 (1974).
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subject.' 5 4 But he was also a frequent writer on issues of legal education. It is in this scholarly capacity that he presented a contribution
which can be regarded as path-breaking. He even preceded European
comparative tax scholarship, which
is usually regarded as more de155
veloped than its U.S. counterpart.
Chommie began his quest by counting the numerous values of
legal comparative work in general.' 5 6 Unfortunately, he then immediately stated that his purpose was "not to reappraise these values in
a tax context.... " 1 57 Yet, his work provides us with more than a hint
as to why Chommie valued the comparative study of tax law. We
should start by noting that he was a supporter of functionalism, and
specifically advocated it as a method of legal education. 5 8 In this
context, the idea is to teach law not only in conceptual legal terms
(such as contracts, torts, etc.) but also in functional terms, i.e., law as
a response to specific factual patterns. 5 9 In addition, Chommie proposed that comparative taxation should be taught in U.S. law
schools.' 60 In justifying his proposal, he argued that comparative tax
studies should serve policy makers when responding to emerging
needs of democratic communities.' 6 1 In sum, he was a functionalist
who advocated comparative study as a tool for reform. Yet, Chommie-while adopting functionalism as a general approachspecifically warned against simply accepting the functionalist assumption of similarities. 1 6 2 The reform Chommie advocated by the
comparative study of tax law concerns something more (or something
else) than the harmonization or unification of tax laws. Chommie argued that:
The point to be made is simply this: As a condition to understanding other tax systems, one must exhaustively reexamine one's own basic policy position; and if comparative
analysis does no more than stimulate such re-examination,
154. JOHN C. CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (3d ed., West Pub.
Co. 1988) (1967)).
155. On the trailing of American comparative tax scholarship behind the European
scholarship, see generally Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology, supra note 3,
at 119; Thuronyi, What can we Learn from Comparative Tax Law, supra note 12, at
459.
156. Chommie, Why Neglect Comparative Taxation?, supra note 8, at 219.
157. Id.
158. John C. Chommie, What Progress in the FunctionalApproach in Law School
Curricula,8 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (1956).
159. ESTHER LUCILE BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 99

(Irvington Pub. 1989) (1947).
160. Chommie, A Proposed Seminar in Comparative Taxation, supra note 8.
161. Id., at 503-06.
162. Chommie, Why Neglect Comparative Taxation?, supra note 8, at 219 (arguing
that we should account for "social background to legislative action, economic and political forces.., since these are by observation, the most pertinent in any study of taxpolicy making"and that "the investigation of political forces allows even fewer assumptions of similarity .... ").
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it will have served a valuable function in the training of policy-oriented lawyers.
Assuming "understanding" is a code word for sensitivity to differences, Chommie reconciles his two ends in a way similar to Infanti's.
His bottom line is that comparative study is needed to provide a
choice among comparable decisions (rather than a single "proper" so16 3
lution) when attempting needed reform.
Chommie's purposive thinking can serve as a natural link to
Victor Thuronyi's Tax Law Design and Drafting (TLDD). TLDD is a
straight-forward example of the comparable decisions Chommie
sought, as it is intended to present alternatives to tax legislators.
Thuronyi himself sees comparative taxation as an instrument that
provides reference for prospective tax reforms. 164 Taken at face
value, it seems that Thuronyi sees the betterment of tax reforms as
the true purpose of comparative tax study, with no special interest in
whether such reform would lead to the unification of laws. As he specifically states: "the purpose of a comparative approach is to learn
about new possibilities from studying actual practice, to convince by
example, and to avoid reinventing the wheel."' 6 5 It remains unclear,
however, what are-in Thuronyi's view-the standards according to
which one should judge the merits of a tax reform.
Yet, there are some aspects in Thuronyi's writing that specifically advocate convergence. To begin with, Thuronyi sees a
remarkable process of tax systems convergence worldwide. 16 6 He believes that different tax systems have adopted truly similar rules,
despite their different backgrounds. He also specifically argues that
67
"convergence by legal systems ... is always something to look for."'

It is not clear whether this assertion is merely a methodological one
(assumption of similarities as a heuristic device) or a normative one
(convergence as a desirable goal). In any case, Thuronyi also advocates functionally-oriented research for the study of tax
transplants,1 68 and in unearthing common tax principles when classifying countries into legal tax families.This may imply a common
69
core style approach.1
In yet another article, Thuronyi specifically accounts for the values of comparative tax studies. 170 These are: (1) they can provide
another point of view which may help one when reflecting upon one's
own system; (2) they can teach us about the historical development of
163. Chommie, A ProposedSeminar in ComparativeTaxation, supra note 8, at 504.
164. THuRoNYI, COMPARATwE TAX LAw, supra note 2, at 1.
165. THuRoNYI, COMPARATrvE TAX LAw, supra note 2, at 4.

166. Id., at 15-17.
167. Id., at 5.
168. Id., at 4-5; Thuronyi, TLDD I, supra note 31, at xxviii.
169. Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxv.

170. Thuronyi, What Can We Learn from Comparative Tax Law?, supra note 12.
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tax systems and their convergence; (3) since tax "touches virtually all
phenomena of society," by comparative study we are required to understand the legal context; and (4) teaching comparative taxation can
provide alternatives for solving a tax issue.
It is fairly difficult to summarize Thuronyi's stance regarding the
purpose of comparative tax studies in terms of the general comparative debate. On the one hand, he emphasizes convergence and
historical approaches; on the other, he does not miss social contexts
and the understanding of differences. Yet, he does not reconcile these
ends. It is possible that Thuronyi is a victim of the discursive failure
and thus is unable to produce a coherent approach.
Lastly, I turn my focus on William Barker. Barker, like Infanti,
attempted to portray comprehensively the theoretical facets of a comparative approach to tax law 17 1 and to address the objectives of
comparative taxation within this framework. One of Barker's articles
states his view regarding the purpose of comparative tax studies
quite clearly: "Expanding the study of comparative tax law to promote
democratic policy" (emphasis added). 17 2 Yet, when formulating his
objectives within the article, he seemingly adheres to a sort of "grab
bag" attitude:
Whether the audience is students, who want to gain a better
understanding of their own system, or students or practitioners who need knowledge of a foreign system in an everexpanding global environment, or legislators who wish to
consider foreign solutions for their own country, comparative
tax law performs an important role.' 7 3
Barker seems to pursue an even more general approach by saying that his objective is "to create a view of tax law as a tool for
human development.' 7 4 This statement explains little more than
that comparative tax is "important." To understand where Barker
might be positioned in our framework, it is useful to note that he
launched his comparative endeavor through "examining [the] system's approach to the resolution of similar problems," which is the
bread and butter of functionalism. 75 But he also explicitly holds the
traditional functional approach to comparative law insufficient for
the comparative study of tax laws because this "largely analytical approach to law does not advance a realistic view of law and thus does
76
not promote comparative tax law's ability to advance legal theory.'
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Law, supra note 9, at 703-12.
Id.
Id., at 708.
Id., at 711.
Barker, A ComparativeApproach to Income Tax Law, supra note 48, at 8.
Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Law, supra note 9, at 706.
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He does not seek to reject traditional functionality completely, but
177
rather to revamp it by giving it a clearly stated normative stance.
Barker notes the existence of many differences in the particulars
of tax laws and argues that these differences can be "appropriately
characterized as fundamental doctrinal differences regarding the
proper approach to the formulation of tax base.' u 78 Like Infanti, he
believes that tax transplants can be successful as long as their adaptability to local cultural contexts is carefully considered. 179 More than
that, Barker's view is that transplants are not only a means of importing possible tax 0solutions, but also a means to spread desirable
18
democratic values.
Thus, Barker is best described as taking a middle-ground in this
discussion though leaning towards the functionalist "unifying" end.
His idea is to respect differences while promoting certain values
(democratic ones) which implies that not all differences should be
respected equally. Also, if only certain values are to be advanced, convergence becomes a sensible outcome.
B. The "What". Comparative Tax Law and its Objects of
Comparison
1. In General
There is no easy way to summarize contemporary comparative
tax literature with respect to its objects of comparison. The only distinctive feature is that tax comparatists see the issue of variable
selection in very different ways. Some include numerous jurisdictions
in their research in order to encompass a worldwide perspective in
their studies, while others find it sufficient to compare only two.
Some see tax comparison as a broad issue that necessitates a generalized observation of tax systems as "wholes," while others look at
narrow issues specifically in order to avoid this generalization. Surprisingly, such differences are seldom debated. As long as this silence
persists we are left with nothing but a mishmash of possible choices
where each comparatist can compare whatever he or she wants without the risk of being exposed to any criticism as to the choice of
objects of comparison and its possible ideological implications.
177. Id.
178. Barker, A ComparativeApproach to Income Tax Law, supra note 48, at 7.
179. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Law, supra note 9., at 716-23.

180. Id., supra note 9, at 727 (arguing that "[t]he comparative study of tax law
affirms the conclusion that achieving a democratic policy of economic equality is the
result of a struggle for its recognition which must be constantly advanced. Thus, com-

parative tax law is critical to a more complete understanding of how democratic
society grapples with the problems of economic equality.").
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Which Jurisdictions?

One problem of the comparative tax non-discourse is that only a
few tax comparatists provide any explanation of their selection of
compared jurisdictions. To begin with, there is the question of classification into tax families as a basis for jurisdictional variables
selection: without a doubt, Thuronyi pioneered this issue in the tax
arena. In two works he elaborates his ideas of jurisdictional tax classification. 18 1 However, Thuronyi admits that his classification
"largely tracks the classification of legal families by comparative law
scholars.' 82 Against such taxonomy, one could argue that it presupposes what it seeks to achieve, since the existing taxonomy originates
in comparative studies of private law. So at the least it is questionable whether such a taxonomy is really helpful in comparative public
law research, such as tax law. Yet, in favor of Thuronyi's taxonomy
we can say that he notes some differences from the conventional classification which are due to the fact that his classification is focused on
income tax.'8 3 Also, Thurnoyi's taxonomy can be quite comfortably
regarded as a result of years of experience as a tax advisor, and thus
an outcome of a realistic research rather than an ex-ante heuristic
assumption. Another strength that can be attributed to his taxonomy
isthe fact that he largely avoids Eurocentrism. His taxonomy is truly
global in nature, taking into account dozens of jurisdictions.
Thuronyi believes that his classification can provide a head start
for future research.' 8 4 It seems that his primary criterion for classification is the level of similarity of a specific country to a specific legal
tax tradition, 8 5 namely, the civil law tradition, the common law tradition, or what he calls the European law tradition. 186 Very similar to
Zweigert and Kotz, his classification leads him to suggest a rule of
thumb for the selection of jurisdictions which are representative of a
larger tax family. He suggests Germany, France, the United States,
and the United Kingdom as natural choices for comparison. 8 7 Such
an approach exposes him to criticism of ethnocentrism. It also suggests that Thuronyi adheres to an assumption of jurisdictional
comparability. After all, the reason to choose these jurisdictions, according to Thuronyi, is that these countries can be regarded as
"leaders in influencing the tax laws of other countries." 8 8
181. THuRoNi, COMPARATIVE TAX LAw, supra note 2, at 7-10, 23-44; Thuronyi,

TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxiii-xxxv.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Thuronyi, TLDD II, supra note 31, at xxv.
Id.
Id.
THuRoNYI, COMPARATIVE TAX LAw, supra note 2, at 7.
Id., at 24-25.
Id., at 9.
Id.
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Thuronyi does explore other possible criteria for jurisdictional
tax classification, but rejects them. For example he suggests that we
could classify tax systems along economic lines.' 8 9 Such classification
could be determined by looking at the size of tax revenue and the
components of the tax mix. This classification, Thurnoyi admits,
would probably result in a much different taxonomy than the traditional one. For example, it would probably group together many
OECD countries, despite their origins in different legal traditions.
Thurnoyi rejects such classification on the ground that it could prove
to be "misleading."1 9 0 His reason is that the various systems may produce significantly different tax mixes, which would put them in
different classes, even though the economic effects are the same. For
example, "a country extensively using tax expenditures (e.g., the
United States) will show a lower tax share as compared with other
countries (e.g., many European countries) that accomplish the same
policies with direct expenditure programs whose economic effects
may be very similar to those of tax expenditures."1 91 This example
explains nothing more than Thuronyi's general tendency towards the
functional classification. The reason he rejects economic classification
is that it prevents us from discerning which tax laws or institutions
fulfill the same economic function. This is tautological reasoning
which, simply put, rejects non-functional classification because it is
not a functional classification. Functionalism might indeed be a preferred criterion of tax classification, but if so, Thuronyi does not
explain why.
With that background Barker's scholarship rings very different.
Like Thuronyi, Barker asserts that "the fundamental contextual
starting place of comparative law is that different nations belong to
different legal families." 9 2 Yet, he immediately notes the fact that
the traditional classification is closely associated with scholarship in
private law, and thus may not provide equally important insights for
purposes of tax law. Barker-in a way strikingly different from
Thurnoyi's classification-argues that taxation "does have its own
taxonomy"' 9 3 and suggests classifying tax systems according to their
"defining elements." 194 Those defining elements should be critically
examined in order to determine whether they help to promote the
democratic values which, as you recall, are the goals to be advanced
by comparative tax studies according to Barker. Thus, we are dealing
with normative rather than functional criteria for classification. The
"normative underpinnings" of democratic taxation according to
189. Id., at 10.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id., at 11.
Id. (italics added).
Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax, supra note 9, at 711.
Id., at 712.
Id.
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Barker are "equity, both horizontal and vertical, and redistributive
justice."1 95 Of course, Barker's unique criteria could be criticized on
various grounds. But given the objectives that Barker ascribes to
comparative tax studies, he is doing a much better job explaining his
criteria for classification than Thurnoyi does.
Barker's approach is evident in an earlier comparative study,
published well before he developed his classification criteria, in which
he selected the United States and the United Kingdom as comparatives. 196 He explained then that both countries share the "same
general system of law" and thus offer a "natural comparison. 1 9 7 But
he also noted that both systems started with remarkably different
tax systems and that a comparison of strikingly different systems
may "yield the greatest insight into the nature of legal doctrine."' 9 8
Loyal to his assertion, he later added South Africa to this equation,
precisely because it is a country at a very early stage of democratic
transition, with a new legal environment and tax system. Thus it offers a natural field of inquiry for comparative tax study aimed at
promoting democratic values. In other words, Barker would probably
reject the functional limitation which requires us to compare jurisdictions with tax systems at a similar evolutionary stage.
Livingston's scholarship can be regarded as the most refined in
this regard. Comparing tax progressivity in the United States, Italy,
India, and Israel, Livingston admits that these countries were chosen
in part because of his linguistic abilities, but also on the basis of their
"distinctive features."' 99 According to Livingston, India, Israel, and
Italy "are advanced enough to have a sophisticated tax policy discourse, but each has political and cultural features that renders its
tax policy necessarily different from that of the others and the United
States."20 0 Livingston virtually deconstructs the jurisdictional "comparability" requirement of the functional approach into its two
components. The first is the requirement that the systems compared
be at a similar evolutionary stage. To a significant extent, Livingston
accepts this requirement by noting that the jurisdictions selected
should be sufficiently "advanced" or "sophisticated" with respect to
their tax policies. The second is the requirement of functional equivalence of the laws being compared. By noting the unique differences in
the selected jurisdictions' tax politics and tax cultures, probably as a
prerequisite for obtaining comparative insights, Livingston rejects
this requirement. In a sense, instead of showing how supposedly different laws achieve similar ends, he shows how supposedly similar
195. Id.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Barker, A ComparativeApproach to Income Tax Law, supra note 48.
Id., at 8.
Id., at 9.
Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, supra note 41, at 556.
Id., at 557.
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laws achieve different ends. Livingston thus stands between
Thuronyi and Barker. On the one hand, he would probably support
Barker in choosing a classification criterion which is unique to the
purpose of tax studies (tax cultures in Livingston's case) but on the
other hand, he acknowledges the necessity to consider developmental
criteria as well.
Chommie suggested comparing the tax systems of the United
States and Canada, noting that the availability of Canadian materials in English is "of paramount importance." 20 1 Luckily, Chommie
left us with more than a mere technical lingual consideration. Given
the importance that Chommie ascribes to comparative studies as a
catalyst for reform of the home system, it is not surprising to find
him arguing that the primary substantive consideration in the selection of foreign taxation materials is "the light that they may shed on
the tax-policy-making process in the United States."20 2 Chommie offers several reasons why Canada's tax system is a successful
candidate to shed light on the U.S. tax system. 20 3 First, Canadalike the United States-is a federal government. This would allow a
critical examination of federal/state issues in the United States. Second, Canada presents a markedly similar economic structure. Third,
Canada shares a common legal and cultural heritage with the United
States. Fourth, at the time when Chommie wrote his proposals, Canada was a vibrant arena of tax reforms and professional tax-related
activities, which in Chommie's
view, transformed Canada into a more
"mature tax community." 20 4 Thus Chommie, even though not a true
traditional functionalist, resorts to a very functional-oriented approach in the choice of jurisdictions to be compared, especially when
they share a similar background and similar level of development.
3.

Micro or Macro Comparison?

The question of the scope of tax law comparison also attracts
strikingly divergent views expressed by tax comparatists, yet they
also go unchallenged. The most obvious representative of the macro
end of the spectrum is Garbarino, who argues that tax systems
should be studied comparatively as "wholes."20 5 Garbarino makes his
stand very clear, but does not provide an explanation for his prefer201. Chommie, A Proposed Seminar in Comparative Taxation, supra note 8, at 504.

Today, Chommie's prerequisite can usually be met with regard to most jurisdictions.
Various databases provide detailed accounts in English of tax systems in most jurisdictions, the best example is the enormously voluminous database of the
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), listed at: http://www.ibfd.org/
portalIapp?bookmarkablePage=org.ibfd.portal.presentation.Shop.
202. Chommie, A ProposedSeminar in Comparative Taxation, supra note 8, at 506.
203. Id., at 504-06.

204. Id., at 506.
205. Garbarino, An Evolutionary and Structural Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4, at 684.
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ence for macro comparison. Barker, on the other hand, takes a
similar position but does provide an idea of the reasons behind such a
choice. When studying comparatively the tax systems of the United
States and the United Kingdom, 20 6 he explains that his inquiry seeks
"to investigate the nature and development of tax law through an examination of the general structure of two systems." 20 7 Barker
acknowledges the subjective nature of the choice of objects of comparison, but also embraces it. 208 Unlike Garbarino, he recognizes that
there is no macro level without a micro level and hence is not exposed
to Chodosh's criticism aimed at comparatists who tend to disengage
one from the other. 20 9 In order to characterize tax systems at the
macro-level one must do some "micro work." Barker specifically notes
that his way of demonstrating the "general structure" of tax systems
is by comparing specific topics which "were chosen due to the often
dramatic way they expose the fundamental nature" of the systems
compared. 2 10 The "micro-comparisons" to be performed presumably
correlate with what Barker later termed the "defining elements" of
tax systems. Such elements, he argues, "provide a critical structure
for comparative analysis." 2 11 A somewhat similar approach is taken
by Thuronyi, who describes the primary characteristics of numerous
2 12
specific areas of taxation in order to "survey the whole."
Infanti provides an opposite example regarding the breadth of
comparison. Like many other authors, he chose to compare a narrowly defined topic, namely the tax treatment of contributions made
by domestic taxpayers to foreign NGOs. 2 13 Infanti's justification for
this micro-approach seems to be primarily practical, i.e., that a single
researcher would be unable to conduct a broad meaningful comparison. In light of the complex nature of tax law, this is a good reason,
but it is incomplete without an explanation why one specific narrow
area of tax law should be a preferred object of comparison over others.
2 14
Infanti's explanation for his choice is discussed below.
Livingston probably provides the most elaborate account of the
micro/macro choice, and eventually takes a middle ground. He starts
by categorizing tax culture literature based on how broadly the term
"tax culture" has been used. 21 5 At one end of the spectrum tax culture is used in a "macroscopic sense, to refer to broad beliefs and
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Barker, A ComparativeApproach to Income Tax Law, supra note 48.
Id., at 8.
Id.
Chodosh, supra note 27, at 1111.
Id.
Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax, supra note 9, at 711.
THURONYI, COMPARATWVE TAx LAW, supra note 2, at 7.
Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination,supra note 9.
See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology, supra note 3, at 122-24.
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practices and their impact upon the contemporary tax system."2 1 6
The other end of the spectrum is "narrower in focus," 2 17 and "tends to
use the idea of culture in an unsystematic way." 2 18 There is also middle ground, which encompasses tax culture as an expression of both a
narrowly structured phenomenon, as well as broad cultural attitudes. 2 19 Livingston then applies this categorization to state his
hypothesis. 2 20 He argues that broad cultural or historical tendencies
are poor explicators of tax differences as they tend to over-generalize.
The problem with the comparison of broad perspectives is that such
perspectives are "filtered" through specific tax cultures to an extent
that eventually renders them unrecognizable. "It seems more promising," he thus argues, "to find explanation in narrower, tax related
institutions or traditions-what might be called the intermediate
level between the overall national culture and specific tax rules or
22 1
institutions."
4.

Which Tax Laws?

Two issues emerge when contemplating the tax laws to be compared: what qualifies as a "tax rule" and-assuming we can
distinguish tax rules from non-tax rules-which tax rules should we
compare?
The first of these issues, what is a tax rule, is closely related to
the above discussion of what is comparative taxation. Unfortunately,
this question has also largely been neglected by tax comparatists.
Presumably, the question could be dismissed as a "non-issue" since
"tax professionals speak a common language."2 22 So, if a common language for taxation does exist, we probably know what this language
is all about. Such an assertion might be appealing and is not necessarily out of touch with reality. Yet, we should be very careful when
stating that we know what the field's unifying tertium comparationis
is, if the statement really rests purely on the claim that tax laws are
simply "there" and are expressed in a "common language."
For example, an American tax comparatist would probably be
quite comfortable asserting that a comparison of the administrative
powers employed by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service on the one
hand and by the Department of Zakat and Income Tax in Saudi Arabia on the other is clearly within the borders of comparative taxation.
However, it would be much harder to find common tax terms which
describe Zakat from an American scholarly perspective. Under Saudi
216. Id., at 122.

217. Id.
218. Id., at 123.
219. Id.
220. Id., at 127-29, 132.
221. Id., at 128.
222. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax, supra note 9, at 711.
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law, Saudi nationals do not pay income tax. They are, however, subject to Zakat, which is charitable giving to the needy, required by
Islamic law. For purposes of receiving foreign tax credits, the IRS has
determined that Zakat is not a credible tax since it is not a "tax" in an
American sense. 2 23 So, is research comparing income tax compliance
in the United States with Zakat compliance in Saudi Arabia research
in comparative tax law? Or is it simply comparative law research
dealing with law compliance? Maybe a "common language" is more
wishful thinking than reality after all?
Thus, the "what is comparative taxation" question cannot be
fully tackled without a necessary discourse about the boundaries of
comparative taxation. Presumably, such boundaries will never be
clearly defined, but a discourse should still produce some defining criteria for our field of study. Defining what is "comparative" about a
study is a worn-out topic; defining what is a comparative study about
"taxation"-not nearly as much. Within the scope of this Article, it is
not possible to develop a coherent and convincing argument as to
what is a "tax law" from a comparative perspective, but we can say
this much: the use of terms such as "common language" or "comparable tax law" eventually boils down to an acceptance or rejection of
functionalism.
If we accept functionality as a suitable approach to the study of
comparative tax, we must discuss the most basic similarity of functions that tax systems are intended to fulfill. Only the comparison of
laws that share the most basic function of tax law can be regarded as
comparative taxation from a functional perspective. So what is this
"basic function"? Is it simply the generation of national revenue? If
so, does the international comparison of speeding tickets fines fall
within the boundaries of comparative taxation? Is it redistributive
justice? And if so, does the cross-border comparison of social benefit
laws qualify as a study in comparative taxation? To date, functional
tax comparatists have neglected the most basic prerequisite needed
to define their field of study: what basic function transforms a law
into a tax law? Moreover, what if we reject functionalism? What is
the common ground then by which we define the "tax laws" we compare? If we do not discuss such common ground, are we tax
comparatists at all? Or are we just comparatists who compare texts
in which the word "tax" appears more often than not?
Moreover, to date tax comparatists have engaged in the comparative study of almost any field of taxation, from controlled foreign
corporations (CFC) regimes to the process of tax reforms in developing countries. As noted, a choice of topic may imply an ideological
perspective regarding the questions that tax comparatists should
ask. Since no criteria have been developed to decide which questions
223. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,263 (Sept. 21, 1977).
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tax comparatists should ask, most comparative tax articles simply focus on the specific area of interest or expertise of the tax scholar who
writes them. In other words, we have no real way to judge which comparative tax studies offer the most valuable insights, and which
studies add only marginal value to the development of the field. Two
tax comparatists however, did provide a somewhat detailed justification for their choice of tax laws.
When examining his theoretical framework, Infanti justified his
micro-approach to comparing the tax treatment of contributions
2 24
made by domestic taxpayers to foreign NGOs on practical grounds.
But he added another justification which is purpose-driven. The purpose is to show that reform and simplification of the Internal
Revenue Code can go hand-in-hand. Hence, he chose to compare this
area of tax law, because it "suffers from both the excessive complexity
and the failure to keep pace with a changing economy." 2 25 Naturally,
such criteria advance his specific purpose, but can "excessive complexity" and "failure to keep pace with a changing economy" also
serve as proper general criteria for the selection of tax laws to compare? Luckily, Infanti does provide an answer to such questions in a
later article-an answer which again posits him at the critical end of
the tax-comparison spectrum. Explaining his choice in retrospect, Infanti admits that the issue of deductibility of cross-border
contributions to foreign NGOs is somewhat esoteric. 22 6 He further explains that he chose this subject specifically for its marginality,
"because it was not a topic about which academics studying international tax normally write."2 27 Part of his purpose in doing so, he

continues, "was to try to move the international tax discourse beyond
the usual subjects." 2 28 With this assertion Infanti acknowledges his

critical view of comparative tax studies.
Another tax comparatist who convincingly justifies his choice of
laws is Barker. Barker suggests studying the "defining elements" of
income tax systems:
Exemptions and tax preferences are the defining elements of
a tax system and are critical to the comparative study of tax
law. Exemptions and preferences strongly indicate whether
the ideals of equity and distribution are being achieved by a
the sources of the vast
particular system because they 22are
9
majority of direct tax transfers.
224. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination,supra note 9, at 1157.
225. Id.
226. Anthoni C. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis,
Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a Collective Identity, 25 WHIrrIER L. REV. 707,
796 (2005) [hereinafter: A Tax Crit Identity Crisis].
227. Id.

228. Id., at 796-97.
229. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law, supra note 9, at 715.
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Assuming we accept Barker's ideological stance-namely, that
the purpose of comparative tax study is to promote democratic values
and that these values culminate in a call for distributive justice-he
makes a valid point as to the choice of tax laws to be studied. If we
seek tax benchmarks of distributive justice, we should certainly compare tax laws that actually distribute, such as tax exemptions and
preferences.
C. The "How": Comparative Tax Studies and the Construction of
Similarities and Differences
1. In General
The act of comparison itself is supposedly a technical one, and
hence apolitical. In reality however, techniques serve particular purposes and cannot be detached from an ideological stance. Even the
most generalized blueprint of comparison would have to take a particular shape when executed. One would have to decide which legal
texts to read, which non-legal sources to consult, how to interpret
texts and data, and so on. All of these choices are deeply embedded in
subjective views, which may be ideologically affected.
This makes it quite obvious that there is no one-size-fits-all technique. 230 For example, the comparison of tax compliance cultures and
the comparison of effective corporate tax rates in different countries
cannot be possibly performed in accordance with the same standards
and procedures, and it is doubtful that such comparisons can serve
the same purposes. Some would argue that the self-evident result is
that-when it comes to methodology-comparative tax research
must resort to eclecticism. 23 1 In my view, however, complete eclecticism is undesirable. A coherent discourse would address the question,
among many others: which is more important to compare (tax cultures or tax rates)? If an academic discourse marginalizes specific
kinds of tax comparison and emphasizes others, it would have to concentrate the methodological discussion on techniques which are most
relevant to the "important kinds" of comparisons. This would make
the methodological discussion significantly less eclectic. In case we
should experience a paradigmatic shift in the discussion, it is reasonable to assume that a methodological shift would follow. In other
words, in order to establish which methods are currently most suitable for the purposes of comparative tax law, we should start by
developing a discourse on the purposes of comparative tax law instead of simply resorting to eclecticism. As tax comparatists, we
should commit to specific academic purposes rather than proclaim
that all purposes are equally important.
230. See Kamba, supra note 15, at 511.
231. For a critical look at the issue, see generally Kennedy, The Methods and the
Politics, supra note 27, at 352-55.

HeinOnline -- 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 454 2010

20101

DISCURSIVE FAILURE IN COMPARATIVE TAX LAW

The following survey clearly demonstrates that different tax
comparatists have taken different approaches towards the process of
comparison, from both practical and normative perspectives. The fact
that they ignore each other's methodological stances is a serious
problem in comparative tax law research. Each tax comparatist conducts his scholarship in his own intimate methodological bubble, free
from outside critique. The result is that tax comparatists do not reflect on their methodological practices and ideologies. Taking a
critical position, I would conclude that to date, legal comparative tax
studies simply lack "self-consciousness."
2.

Methodological Conflicts in Comparative Tax Law

Not all tax comparatists explain their purposes and choices, or
their underlying assumptions. Yet, even if they do not explain their
technique, it can be determined by looking at what they actually do.
Thus, projects of comparative taxation often provide examples of coherent methodological approaches, even though the author may not
be aware of it.
One such example is the annual CahiersDe DroitFiscal International published by the International Fiscal Association (IFA), which
provides a comparative report on a specific field of tax law in each of
the two volumes published every year. From a jurisdictional perspective the Cahiers provide a rather comprehensive analysis. Given the
sheer magnitude of the IFA 2 32 and the central role it plays in the

global tax environment, the Cahiers certainly have significant effect
on the very issue of "what is currently important" in the tax world. In
that sense they advance a particular kind of comparative tax discourse. They are also interesting for another reason, i.e., the method
by which they are produced. Every year, the IFA invites local specialists from around the world to address a particular tax issue. These
specialists are presented with a series of questions, many times in
the form of a case study. Each specialist produces a national report
summarizing his local jurisdiction's handling of such a case. The reports are presented to a general reporter who compiles a general
report summarizing the trends. 233 In methodological terms, this
bears a strong resemblance to Schlesinger's Common Core Project.
For example, Masui, the general reporter for the second 2004 report
that dealt with a comparative analysis of group taxation, specifically
232. In 2008, the IFA had 59 branches and over 12,500 members worldwide. See

Han A. Kogels, What is the IFA?, httpJ/www.ifa.nl/index.htm (last visited Nov. 22,

2009).
233. For the description of the methodology used for the compilation of the Cahiers,

see, e.g., Kees van Reed, GeneralReport, 73a
25 (1988).

CAHiERS DE DROIT

HeinOnline -- 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 455 2010

FiscAL INT'L 21, 21-

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 58

presents his report in functional terms. 23 4 The report also concludes
that there are four primary regimes of group taxation and that each
235
jurisdiction surveyed can be associated with one of these regimes.
Such classification brings forward the common core of group income
taxation for each "family" of jurisdictions.
Another example of such a common-core-like project in tax law is
found in Hugh Ault's and Brian Arnold's work. 2 36 Their book states
its functional orientation at the outset by saying that "[t]he purpose
of this book is to compare different solutions adopted by nine industrialized countries to common problems of income tax design."2 3 7
Here too, local specialists were asked to provide accounts of their
home tax systems. Ault and Arnold then synthesized the country reports into a form of general analysis which categorizes the findings.
They, too, recognize legal "family resemblances" among different jurisdictions which belong to parent legal traditions. 2 38 Ault and
Arnold's work primarily reveals the "many communalities" 23 9 among
the systems compared, thus again providing some form of common
core.
However, there are two important differences vis-a-vis the IFA
Cahiers. First, the scope: while the Cahiers cover narrowly-defined
issues in a rather technical way, Ault and Arnold try to establish a
general picture of tax systems encompassing the legislative process,
administration, adjudication, and legal interpretation. Such research
certainly provides a "more nuanced understanding of how to approach the income tax in each country than is produced by a mere
description of tax rules."2 40 This is related to the second important
difference: namely, that local experts were asked to go beyond a mere
description of the respective tax laws; they also provided an account
of the history and sources of tax law, the legislative process, constitutional considerations, tax process and administration, the role of
adjudication, and so on. This is reminiscent of Sacco's legal formants
approach. In sum, from a methodological perspective, while the IFA
Cahiers can be regarded as the "tax-duplicate" of Schlesinger's project, Ault and Arnold's work is something like a small scale TaxTrento-Project.
Garbarino is a rare example of a comparative tax scholar whose
position is very clear on this matter. I criticize Garbarino in relative
detail in Part IV of the Article, so for now I will only make some short
234. Yoshihiro Masui, General Report, 89b CAHIERS DE DROIT FiscAL INTrL 21, 3133 (2004).
235. Id., at 29-31.
236. AULT & ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION, supra note 6.
237. Id., at xix.
238. Id., at xxii.

239. Stewart, supra note 35, at 1327.
240. Id., at 1326.
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observations regarding his approach. We have already noted Garbarino's advocacy for the functional approach. But Garbarino goes
further than simply suggesting such an approach. He specifically advocates the use of both the common core and the legal formants
approaches for purpose of comparative taxation. Interestingly, he
also advocates the use of comparative law and economics, asserting
that "the institutional approach can be used in a comparative taxation to consider operative tax rules in a context in which alternative
24 1
solutions can be readily compared in connection with their costs."

At first glance, Thuronyi's Comparative Tax Law looks like another clear-cut case as it purports to deal "with core common
knowledge that any well-informed lawyer should have." 24 2 More pre-

cisely, he tries to "identify the key elements of legal traditions for tax
law." 24 3 This, by definition, is an attempt to discover common cores.

Thuronyi is also sensitive to formants-related issues noting the "di2
vergent interests" of multiple actors which affect the tax process. 44
Yet, when explaining his "comparative method," 24 5 Thuronyi resorts
to an extreme form of eclecticism and notes that historical, sociologi246
cal, and economic methods are all relevant to the study of tax law.
Unfortunately, he does not provide any guidelines on how to choose
methods for tax comparison and we are left to guess.
Barker, as you recall, suggested "viewing the concepts of income
taxation from an ideological perspective." 2 47 This represents a shift
away from the supposedly apolitical stance of functionalism. Yet
Barker does not reject functionalism altogether; instead, he makes it
the functions of tax systems in promoting
self-aware. He questions
2 48
distributive justice:
The critical assumptions or presuppositions underlying the
legal discourse of income taxation in the world today are the
general economic definitions of the income tax base. The
starting place for most tax policy discussions is the accretion
concept of income and what is now known as the comprehen24 9
sive income base.

In other words, Barker provides a benchmark for comparison:
"the accretion concept." Barker also makes it clear that by "accretion
241. Id.
242. THuRoNyi, COMPARATIvE TAX LAw, supra note 2, at xiii-xiv.

243. Id., at 3.
244. Id., at 21.
245. Id., at 3-7.
246. Id., at 4-6.
247. Barker, Expanding the Study of Comparative Tax Law, supra note 9, at 712.
248. Id., at 714.
249. Id.
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concept" he refers to the Schanz-Haig-Simons model. 25 0 Thus,
Barker's technique can be associated with a reformed version of comparative law and economics. He offers an economic model (SchanzHaig-Simons) to be used as a reference point for the identification of
similarities and differences among tax systems. Yet, unlike Mattei's
approach, Barker's comparative analysis is aimed at distributive justice rather than efficiency.
Given Infanti's critical stance towards functionalism, it is not
surprising that he starts out with his comparative tax analysis 2by
51
rejecting the five-step approach suggested by Zweigert and K6tz.
Instead, he adopts Kamba's general scheme of description, identification, and explanation. 25 2 As we have already noted, one has to fill
Kamba's model with some practical content in order to transform it
from an abstract scheme into a workable technique. Yet, it seems
that Infanti fails to do so. Instead, he basically restates Kamba's assertion. In his descriptive phase, Infanti suggests that the studied tax
25 3
rules should be described in "their historical and cultural context."
In the identification phase the rules are to "be compared and constructed in an effort to identify any similarities among them and
differences between them." 25 4 And in the explanation phase the rean appropriate
sults are "employed as a framework for developing
255
rule for enactment by the United States."
It is obvious that Infanti went to great length to provide a full
account of the relevant laws in each jurisdiction as well as the pertinent historical development and political discourse that surrounded
the creation of these rules. In that sense, Infanti's approach is simple
and complicated at the same time. It is simple because deducting a
practical rule from his descriptive work would be to study the laws
and contexts of the foreign jurisdictions. It is complicated because
this is indeed a daunting task, and Infanti is not entirely clear as to
how it should be performed. His explanatory phase is rather short
and unexpectedly "mainstream," given his usual critical stand. Instead of deconstructing the findings to expose the political interest
underlying them, as a truly critical writer would, he places the jurisdictions along an imaginary spectrum of possible choices. 25 6 Instead
of deconstructing abstract notions, he constructs them. It is a puzzle
250. This model is defined as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question." See HENRY C.
SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 206 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1993) (1938), cited in
Barker, A ComparativeApproach to Income Tax Law, supra note 48, at 11-12.
251. Infanti, Spontaneous Tax Coordination, supra note 9, at 1140-41.
252. Id., at 1141.
253. Id., at 1158.
254. Id., at 1159.
255. Id.

256. Id., at 1223-26.
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that after attacking the mainstream discourse of tax reform in the
United States, he brings his comparative findings straight back into
the framework of this mainstream discourse, assessing the possible
comparative solutions in terms of "efficiency, fairness, the competitiveness of U.S. multinationals, the impact on political relations with
foreign countries, the need to raise revenue, and the prevention of tax
avoidance and evasion." 25 7 The reason for such ambivalence is perhaps that, at the time when Infanti outlined his approach, his
identity as a critical scholar was not fully shaped. Infanti, in his own
258
words, was probably a "closet" tax-crit not yet ready to be exposed.
Luckily for us, since then Infanti has made his critical position quite
clear, enriching our comparative tax environment with a truly critical
comparatist.
A further shift away from traditional functionalist techniques of
comparison can be observed in Livingston's scholarship. Livingston's
starting point is that:
[c]omparative taxation.., inevitably focuses attention of the
problems of tax culture and the ways in which different
country's tax systems may be extremely different
from one
25 9
another, even if they face the same problems.
As in the case of the cultural branch in general comparative law,
when reading Livingston's work, it is hard to put into practical terms
what exactly it is that a cultural tax comparatist should do. But I
doubt that Livingston, as a true cultural comparatist, would find it
desirable to put the notion of tax culture into a generalized dogmatic
scheme. That said, Livingston is aware of the fact that one cannot
perform a successful comparative tax culture study without meticulous attention to the definition of culture. 2 60 Hence he provides some
guidelines for the possible components of tax cultures and their
comparisons.
Livingston's quest for the identification of tax cultures starts by
affirming that usually, narrow and localized factors play a more important role than "broad cultural norms which are often subject to
misleading or over-stated stereotypes."2 6 1 Thus, within the framework of the Cottorrell-Friedman debate, it seems that Livingston is
257. Id., at 1226.
258. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis, supra note 226, at 810-13. In fact, his most
CLS oriented tax articles were indeed published after Spontaneous Tax Coordination,
which was published in 2002. See, e.g., Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System:
Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on Behalf of Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAX LAw.
407 (2008); Tax Protest, "A Homosexual," and Frivolity: A Deconstructionist Meditation, 24 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 21 (2005); The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy
Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 763 (2004).
259. Livingston, Law, Culture, and Anthropology, supra note 3, at 121.
260. Id., at 132-33.
261. Id., at 132.
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more inclined towards Friedman's suggestions that cultures are best
understood as a general category from which narrow indicators are
devised. For example, some of the possible components considered by
Livingston in from Milan to Mumbai are:
the education and training of tax elites; the relationship between lawyers, economists, and other tax professionals; the
nature of tax administration; attitudes toward tax compliance and evasion; and the unwritten traditions that govern
the making and implementation of tax policy in the country
2 62
in question.
Livingston's scholarship also contains some critical elements.
But unlike most general comparatists who aim this critique at the
process of comparison itself, Livingston is critical at the level of each
jurisdiction. He deconstructs local tax discourse in the countries studied, noting that within each "there is a pronounced tendency for tax
arguments to become an argument about something else." In other
words, his cultural project is aimed at exposing the different underlying-sometimes hidden-local factors which effect tax outcomes and
compares them.
This brief survey of the wide array of methodologies used by tax
comparatists demonstrates the eclectic nature of the field. In and of
itself, such eclecticism in not necessarily a bad thing. In our context,
however, it is, because the form of eclecticism which currently controls the field means that true discourse is missing. With no
discourse, tax comparatists have failed to develop any meaningful
form of guidance to explain which method is to be used and when.
Thus, any prospective comparative tax researcher in search of a
methodology is necessarily left confused. Some guidance is badly
needed if we want to overcome this confusion.
IV.

TAKING SIDES: QUESTIONING GARBARINO'S APPROACH TO
COMPARATIVE TAXATION

A.

In General

It is easy to criticize tax comparatists for not talking to each
other and to challenge them to do so. But one must hold to his own
propositions. If no one talks to each other, someone should start a
conversation and, since I pointed out this failure in the first place, it
is only fitting that this someone should be me.
I will take sides in this yet to be implemented discourse by
presenting my reaction to Carlo Garbarino's recent article. 26 3 Garbarino begins by introducing the purpose of his essay: to have
262. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, supra note 41, at 557.
263. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to ComparativeTaxation, supra note 4.
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comparative tax studies absorb the insights of the general comparative law debate, and to use such insights to formulate the methods

applicable to comparative tax law. 26 4 Garbarino introduces the cur-

rent discourse in general comparative law in a rather simplistic
way, 2 65 and immediately turns to adopt the functional approach for

purpose of comparative taxation.
Garbarino misses the opportunity to refer to important works by
other tax comparatists. As we have seen, functionalist positions towards comparative tax law have been adopted as early as the 1950s
by John Chommie and practiced ever since by comparatists such as
Hugh Ault and Victor Thuronyi. Moreover, other writers have rejected the functional approach for the purpose of comparative tax
studies. His failure to consider previous scholarship enables Garbarino to imply that current comparative tax scholarship is a
"technique," consisting of merely "collecting legislative materials of
different tax systems."2 66 In fact, as noted throughout this Article, it
is hard to find any tax comparatist who treats tax comparison as a
mere juxtaposition of tax rules. Thus, the basis for Garbarino's unconvincing argument is a rather simplistic presentation of the wide
array of ideological choices and their respective methodological counterparts. Garbarino summarizes his approach in four points: (1) tax
systems should be studied as "wholes," (2) comparative taxation must
adhere to the functional approach, (3) comparative taxation should
concentrate on legal transplants, and (4) be viewed as the result of
the circulation of models among different countries. 26 7 Let us take a
look at these points in turn.
B.

The "Tax Systems as a Whole" Myth

At the outset of his article Garbarino opines that "taxation can
only be understood in connection with a global approach which addresses the operation of the legal system as whole." 268 He explains
that "comparative tax studies should not be limited to isolated asconsider tax systems as complex evolutionary
pects but should
26 9
structures."
Here, Garbarino clearly suggests the macro-analysis of tax systems. It is my first observation that Garbarino does not follow his
own suggestion. In a later article, Garbarino offers a comparative
analysis of what he calls "corporate tax models" in order to explain
264. Id., at 670-80.

265. Id.
266. Id., at 685. Cf INTRODUCTION TO CoMPARATIvE TAX LAW (Claudio Sacchetto &
Marco Barassi eds., 2008).
267. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to ComparativeTaxation, supra note 4,
at 685.
268. Id., at 680-81.
269. Id., at 683.
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how corporate tax innovation is a "result of tax competition." 27 0 This
approach hardly coincides with the idea to study tax systems "as a
whole" as it compares a specific area of tax law. Garbarino himself
notes that "we look here at the competition of specific tax structures
and not of tax systems as a whole." 2 71 Even though he makes his
stance quite clear, he does not explain his sudden shift from macro to
micro-analysis.
This lack of coherence can perhaps be explained by the fact that
Garbarino's initial choice of macro-comparison is unconvincing. Garbarino supports his suggestion for macro analysis by citing David
Gerber and Mathias Reimann, 2 72 but in doing so, he misinterprets
both. Gerber, as Garbarino suggests, indeed advances a new form of
comparative thinking, aimed at gaining what he calls "generalizable
knowledge.' 27 3 However, Gerber's quest for "generalization" has nothing to do with macro-comparison, but rather with an attempt to put
comparative knowledge into a cohesive methodological context.
Gerber is unhappy with the fact that comparative legal knowledge
"tends to remain particular, specific-and isolated." 274 This is presumably what Garbarino means when he writes that "comparative
tax studies should not be limited to isolated aspects." This is exactly
what Gerber seeks to remedy-he strives to develop a general
method to pursue such knowledge effectively. 2 75 Garbarino correctly
reads Gerber's suggestion that in order to accomplish such a goal,
legal comparatists must turn their focus towards the process, or the
dynamics of legal systems "to interpret what legal actors have done
and predict what they are likely to do." 27 6 But unlike Garbarino,
Gerber does not suggest that the study of such a process must adhere
to the investigation of systems as "wholes."
Actually, Gerber expresses quite the opposite view. He looks at
the objects of comparison and advances the use of "analytically useful
concepts." One of the criteria that make concepts analytically useful
is that "It]hey will have to refer to specific behavior, so that the analysis can be grounded in observable data."27 7 Accordingly, comparisons
must look at specific rather than generalized variables.
270. Garbarino, Tax Transplants and Circulationof Corporate Tax models, supra
note 128, at 1.
271. Id., at 9 (italics added).
272. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,
at n.22.
273. David J. Gerber, System Dynamics: Towards a Language of Comparative
Law?, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.719, 724-25 (1998).
274. Id., at 723.
275. Id., at 725.
276. Id., at 726.
277. Id., at 728.
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Of course, Gerber seeks to develop a concept of "legal systems,"278 but he specifically rejects the idea of legal systems as "the
totality of factors involving law in a particular jurisdiction."2 79
Rather, he seeks to "define 'legal system' in a way that is both operationally grounded ...

and broad enough to capture the full range of

factors involved." 28 0 In other words, Gerber would probably advocate
the study of particular issues only if they were to shed light on the
broader picture of law in a specific jurisdiction. Interestingly enough,
Gerber-like suggestions resonate loudly in the comparative tax scholarship of Livingston and Barker, which receives little attention from
Garbarino.
Reimann, like Gerber, notes the lack of a coherent theoretical
framework in comparative legal studies, complaining that "comparative law keeps accumulating knowledge in a piecemeal fashion but
then leaves the pieces scattered, fragmentary and often difficult to
access." 2 1 Reimann believes that the first step towards remedying
that malaise is to establish a canon which will provide "a common
ground on which ideas connect, the center around which knowledge
can be organized, and the launching pad from which further research
starts."28 2 But he also asserts specifically that such a canon should be
established on the basis of existing accumulated knowledge. 28 3 Since
such knowledge is accumulated by means of, among others, microcomparisons, I see no urgent call in Reimann's writing for a macroanalysis. When outlining possible goals for successful comparative research, Reimann stresses goals which can be achieved by microanalysis side-by-side with goals which can be achieved by macroanalysis. 28 4 By doing so, Reimann rejects-by implication-the idea
that a comparatists must look at legal systems as a "whole."
This skepticism towards macro-analysis for tax purposes is further strengthened if one questions this approach within the context of
the peculiar nature of tax law. Garbarino defines three unique characteristics of tax law: rapid change, complexity, and heterogeneity of
concepts. 28 5 Most relevant for the micro/macro question is the observation that tax law is highly complex. If, as Garbarino notes, tax law
shows "remarkable variations involving interactions between statutes, administrative guidelines, case law and opinions of scholars,"
how can we address such a combination of complexities as "a whole?"
There may be some unifying explanation that could bring sense and
278. Id.
279. Id., at 729.

280. Id.
281. Reimann, supra note 17, at 687 (citation omitted).
282. Id., at 695-96.

283. Id., at 696.
284. Id., at 698.
285. Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,

at 686-87.
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coherence to this "mishmash of complexities" (for example, unique
cultural characteristics). But we would be unable to find such consistencies if we were to reduce multiple complexities to abstract
systemic notions.
Ultimately, the incredible complexity of tax laws would force us
to deconstruct "tax systems" into components. First, because there is
no possible way we can reduce such an overly elaborate body of law
into abstract terms that would do it justice. Even in a technical
sense, studying tax systems as "a whole" is simply impractical. Second, even if we accept Garbarino's functional stance, the fact remains
that tax systems perform a multiplicity of functions. Consolidating
them all into some single unit to be used as an object of comparison
would necessitate the preference of some functions over others. So
how should one define the "whole" unit? According to which tax
rules? According to definitions of tax base or according to tax expenditures? According to rules supporting corporate reorganizations or to
rules which give preferential treatment to medical expenses? The
only guidance proposed by Garbarino in this matter is a call for eclecticism. I further discuss Garbarino's eclectic stance below.
C. Is the FunctionalApproach Adequate for the Purposes of
Comparative Tax Law?
In his article, Garbarino adopts the functional approach for the
study of comparative tax law. While I do not necessarily reject functionalism in comparative tax studies, I cannot accept it in the form
advanced by Garbarino. His form of functionalism is flawed in three
different aspects. First, Garbarino almost completely ignores the
long-standing critique of functionalism as a general method of comparative legal research. Such lack of engagement puts the integrity of
his arguments at risk.
Second, there is the question whether functionalism is adequate
as a method of comparative legal research in public law. Garbarino
himself notes that "comparative studies have long focused primarily
on private law while public law and especially taxation are relatively
unexplored."28 6 If so, we must question whether functionalism, a
method which was predominantly used for the comparative study of
private law, necessarily fits the study of public law, such as tax rules.
In fact, it was argued that the presumption of similarities-the central pillar of functionalism-does not apply to public law and, as a
result, not to tax law. Rather, "the vast majority of the law taught at
the universities, applied by courts, and... examined by comparative
286. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to ComparativeTaxation, supra note 4,
at 681.
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lawyers is not caught by the presumption." 28 7 This difficulty with the
functional approach was noted by tax comparatists and yet it is
28s
largely ignored by Garbarino.
This brings us directly to the third criticism, i.e., to questioning
the functional approach specifically in light of the unique nature of
tax law. Garbarino explains his choice of the functional approach as
the only one fit to overcome the obstacles to comparing tax rules. For
example, he notes the heterogeneity of tax concepts, stating that
"[t]he problem with tax concepts is that they can often not be compared directly as they are not readily convertible into each other. In
certain cases, similar terms do not have an identical legal meaning
while in other contexts, different terms may mean the same. ' 28 9 Taking such an assertion at face-value, we might accept that functional
analysis is indeed a good way to proceed since it posits the legal problem in factual rather than conceptual terms. But this is true only if
we accept that tax law is completely detached from local contexts.
Garbarino overlooks that such "heterogeneity of tax concepts" might
be the result of divergent cultural or sociological factors, rather than
simple linguistic differences. How would we pose the Saudi Arabian
"Zakat" in functional terms understandable to a U.S. taxpayer? How
should we explain the function of rent imputation in Belgian tax law
to an American homeowner who is indifferent to concepts of imputation? How should we deconstruct "progressivity" into comparable
functional notions? Is it intended to accomplish distributive justice?
If so, how should we define it? Should we limit the impact of redistribution to wage earners, like in Italy? Should it be placed to promote
Zionist social ideologies, like in Israel? Or is it perhaps intended to
benefit the agricultural sector, like in India?290
Tax law is very much about local context. It is the very essence of
the political orientation of any regime in any given jurisdiction. Significantly, unlike some other areas of law, this politicized
characteristic of taxation is clearly evident. There is no need to take a
critical position or to "deconstruct texts" to understand the ultrapoliticized nature of taxation. Tax law is used expressly to promote
political agendas. Political candidates run their electoral campaigns
on tax-reform tickets. For example, the Obama administration's suggestion to repel the check-the-box regulations, 29 1 frequently used by
U.S. multinationals to defer their tax payments and to generate for287. Gerhard Dannemann, ComparativeLaw: Study of Similarities of Differences?,
in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw, supra note 26, at 383, 395.
288. Barker, Expanding the Study of ComparativeTax Law, supra note 9, at 707-

08.
289. Garbarino, An Evolutionary Approach to ComparativeTaxation, supra note 4,

at 687-88.
290. Livingston, From Milan to Mumbai, supra note 41.
291. John D. McKinnon & Jesse Drucker, Firms Face New Tax Curbs, WSJ.COM,
May 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124140022601982149.html.
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eign tax credits, would have been unheard of under a Republican
administration. It has been said that "[elven conservative tax scholars recognize the inherently political nature of their subject."2 92 So
how is it that tax law is not strictly embedded in local contexts? Critical comparatists have been subject to criticism for their attempt to
"politicize" an already politicized field. 29 3 Garbarino actually does
the opposite: he is trying to depoliticize what is clearly political.
Moreover, even if we accept the premise that one should adhere
to the functional approach in comparative tax studies, the question
still remains, which functional approach? Functional analysis is not a
coherent instrument of research, but rather an inclusive term which
encompasses multiple sub-schools of thought. 2 94 Garbarino's answer
is that "comparative tax research should be eclectic as to the methods
available under a functional approach." 295 But Garbarino refrains
from questioning whether eclecticism is desirable at all, which in his
case is especially needed since he seeks to provide us with a coherent
framework for the comparative study of tax laws. One must explain
how eclecticism is to be made coherent. As eloquently put by David
Kennedy: "As an argumentative or rhetorical effect... methodological eclecticism is unstable, the argumentative apparatus which
supports it is full of elisions, ambiguities, hidden contradictions, understatements and overstatements which can be, and often are, the
object of criticism, often from other comparatists." 296 In addition, an
eclectic posture facilitates a lack of methodological commitment, i.e.,
it promotes "methodological disengagement." 29 7 Such disengagement, in turn, enables comparatists to portray themselves as
apolitical actors, thus avoiding scrutiny and critique.
Yet, in order to correct the shortcomings of eclecticism, there is
no need to reject eclectic methodology altogether. Instead, methodological eclecticism can indeed be justified as a paradigm. 298 But in
order to do so, one must disconnect eclecticism from vagueness and
from lack of ideological commitment. Instead, comparatists should
"pursue political projects ... harnessing their mature eclectic pragmatism to political objectives which can be embraced or
contested." 2 99 Eclecticism, as proposed by Garbarino, does not
achieve this goal. Since it lacks clearly stated objectives, Garbarino's
292. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field, supra note 55, at 1798.
293. Ugo Mattei, Comparative Law and Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw, supra note 26, at 815.
294. See, Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAw, supra note 26, at 339, 343-59.
295. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,
at 704.
296. Kennedy, supra note 27, at 353.
297. Id., at 405-06.
298. Michaels, supra note 294, at 362.
299. Id., at 408.
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eclecticism is precisely the form of disengagement which Kennedy
tries to avoid-the kind of eclecticism which forestalls, rather than
advances, a fruitful academic discourse, as it allows comparatists to
avoid critical discussion simply by saying that they pursue different
goals.
D. Legal Transplants,Legal Formants and the Common Core in
Tax Contexts
Putting his functional orientation into practical terms, Garbarino suggests adopting Sacco's legal formants approach in order to
study the circulation of tax transplants. As a substantive matter, this
is not objectionable, but Garbarino reduces the formants approach to
a quasi-formal, all-legal and, by implication, ethnocentric method of
research. Specifically, he observes that "within the Western tax tradition, basically five groups are involved in this process: legislators, tax
30 0
authorities, (tax) courts, practicing lawyers, and legal scholars."
The obvious problem with such an assertion is that it provides no
guidance as to which tax formants we should explore when studying
non-Western jurisdictions. The probable outcome would be narrowlyfocused research from a jurisdictional perspective, meaning that by
providing methodological guidance that is applicable to Western jurisdictions alone, non-Western jurisdictions run the risk of being
neglected in future research.
The second reductive characteristic is that Garbarino's formants
are limited to actors who can be formally recognized as legal professionals. Yet, the legal formants approach has long advanced beyond
looking strictly at legal actors to explain the "making of law." The
European Common Core Approach specifically addresses meta-legal
formants by asking its participants to consider "policy considerations,
economic and/or social factors, social context and values, and the
structure of the legal process." 30 1 The modern formants approach
takes into account local considerations that are not strictly legal,
while Garbarino seeks to keep tax law out of its unavoidably local
context.
This delocalization helps Garbarino reach his conclusion that the
study of tax transplants shows how they lead to convergence. 30 2 This
may be the case in some instances, but certainly not always. Given
the contradicting arguments-specifically in the field of comparative
tax scholarship-Garbarino's assertion calls for further analysis. We
already noted Infanti's arguments, which are specifically aimed at
maintaining divergence in an environment of legal transplants. More
300. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,
at 691.
301. Bussani & Mattei, supra note 77, at 339.
302. Id., at 13.
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recently, questioning the transplantation of British tax rules in
Mandatory Palestine, Assaf Likhovski has convincingly shown that
tax transplantation does not escape local contextualization in the receiving jurisdictions. 30 3 Thus, even in transplantation local context
plays an important role. Some have considered this role so important
that it completely alters the original configuration of the transplanted rule, turning it into a completely new animal. 30 4 If this is
indeed the case, then we must revisit the "transplants = convergence" thesis.
My main critique of Garbarino's operational suggestions is his
adoption of Schlesinger's common core approach for the purpose of
comparative tax studies. 30 5 He maintains that "the comparative tax
scholar interested in revealing deep structures of convergence should
adopt a common core approach." 30 6 In support he cites Pierre
Legrand. 30 7 But Legrand clearly states that "legal systems.., have
not been converging, are not converging and will not be converging."30 I would cautiously guess that Legrand-who portrays
himself as a "difference engineer" 3 0 9 -would probably reject most of
Garbarino's ideas.
But my objection here is more substantive. I believe that the underlying assumptions of the common core approach are not applicable
to comparative tax studies, at least not to the same extent as in private law. For the task of unearthing a common core of legal rules,
one needs to believe that there is indeed such a common core to
unearth. In the case of private law in Europe, this is not an unreasonable assumption. For hundreds of years, legal practices and ideas
have circulated within the continent through legal transplantations.
In such a situation, it is possible to accept that a "common core,"
which transcends apparent differences, was formed during centurieslong processes of legal borrowing. However, this assumption is doubtful in comparative tax studies. Individual income taxation, in its
modern form, is barely 200 years old. Taxation of corporate entities
dates back about a hundred years. VAT-now widely adopted across
the globe-is merely sixty years old and thus, on the scale of legal
history, still an infant. It is much harder to believe that in such a
short time countries were able to distill a true, stable, and broad
303. Assaf Likhovsky, Is Tax Law Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of
Income Tax Law in Mandatory Palestine,11 THEORETICAL INQ. L. (forthcoming 2010).
304. Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal Transplants, 4.4 MAASTRICHT J. EuR.
COMP. L. 111 (1997).
305. Garbarino, An EvolutionaryApproach to Comparative Taxation, supra note 4,
at 697-700.
306. Id., at 697.
307. Id., at n.47.
308. Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 52, 61-62 (1996) (italics added).

309. Legrand, The Same and the Different, supra note 97.
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"common core" of tax rules. Assuming that there is a competitive
market for tax structures, it seems that these structures are still
competing and undergoing constant scrutiny.
Garbarino notes that one of the unique characteristics of tax legislation, as compared to other areas of law, is its unbelievably fast
pace of change. This is the clearest evidence that there is no common
core of taxation, or at best a very narrow one. Tax law is a new historical phenomenon. Even if we accept the assumption that tax law is an
autonomous body of law, free from contextualization, it is still in
search of its true common core. Had tax law found its so-called "core,"
meaningful legislative changes would not occur as often as they do.
Something that changes so rapidly is probably not yet a "core" but
may be better understood as an experimental form of law.
V.

CONCLUSION:

Now, CAN WE TALK?

The argument presented in this Article is straight forward, and
can be summarized in David Gerber's critique of comparative law in
general:
Gains in knowledge produced by a member of the community
are not part of a shared project that renders that knowledge
usable by others. As a result, there is little basis for community among those applying the method. There is, in other
words, little room for "science" if one understands science to
to create new
be a process by which a community seeks
10
members.3
its
to
useful
is
that
knowledge
Unlike general comparative legal studies, where scholars have at
least attempted to engage each other's ideas, tax comparatists simply
ignore each other. In essence, comparative taxation serves as an extreme example for the methodological incoherence that characterizes
general comparative legal studies. To date, there is no debate regarding the purposes of comparative taxation, and as long as we do not
start questioning those purposes, there is little use in discussing
methodologies. And if we do not discuss methodologies, we will encounter difficulties when evaluating each other's research. Under
such conditions, the production of comparative tax knowledge can be
regarded as a somewhat miraculous event. We, comparative tax
scholars, must begin a meaningful discussion and should begin by
utilizing the long established schools of thought in comparative law
as rallying points.

310. Gerber, supra note 273, at 723.
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Michael Livingston once rightfully stated that "a field in which
everyone is shouting at each other is likely to come to no good." 3 1 1 I
would like to add that a field in which no one even talks to each other
is unlikely to produce any better results. So by all means, let's talk!

311. Livingston, Radical Scholars, Conservative Field, supra note 55, at 1815.
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